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REIMAGINING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARD GLOBAL 
REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
RACHEL J. ANDERSON† 
INTRODUCTION 
Existing human rights law, the body of law that delineates the con-
tours of legal protections for human rights, does not do enough to pre-
vent or provide remedies for corporate-related human rights abuses.1 
Transnational corporations are generally excluded from direct responsi-
bility under international human rights law.2 The state-centered nature of 
modern human rights law is inconsistent with the actual power and influ-
ence of many transnational corporations.3 Current human rights law has 
been conflated with international human rights law and so looks almost 
exclusively to states to create laws to protect human rights and mecha-
nisms to enforce those laws.4 However, many modern transnational cor-
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 1. See SARAH JOSEPH, CORPORATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 9 
(2004); see also Edward L. Rubin, Response to Comments, 9 INT’L LEGAL THEORY 167, 173 (2003) 
(“[H]uman rights discourse fails to reflect the conceptual structure and practical realities of the 
modern administrative state.”). See generally JOSEPH, supra note 1 (analyzing human rights litiga-
tion against transnational corporations).  
 2. See Surya Deva, Human Rights Violations by Multinational Corporations and Interna-
tional Law: Where From Here?, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2003) (“[S]ince the existing international 
mechanism was not designed to apply to [transnational corporations], its inadequacy is exposed.”). 
 3. See id. (“States no longer enjoy the monopoly as violators of human rights and no longer 
solely bear the duty to protect human rights.”). States are at the center of international human rights 
law because they are at the center of international law. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 57–58 (5th ed. 1998). 
 4. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm 
(“Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other measures, each State Party to the 
present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional proc-
esses and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other measures as may 
be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”); see also, e.g., Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter ICESCR], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/cescr.htm (“Each State Party 
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porations have achieved a level of power, wealth, and influence that ri-
vals that of states.5 Failure to regulate the power, wealth, and influence of 
transnational corporations is a weakness in human rights law that should 
be remedied.6  
This Article argues that transnational corporations require special-
ized and targeted regulations and laws, and that the conflation of human 
rights law and international human rights law should be reversed to allow 
the advancement of other forms of human rights law. It makes two pro-
posals. First, reimagine human rights law and international human rights 
law as separate categories. Specifically, classify international human 
rights law as a sub-category of human rights law. This distinction high-
lights the need to encourage the development of other forms of human 
rights law, for example, global human rights law and national human 
rights law. Second, establish global human rights law as a sub-category 
of human rights law. Specifically, create a new global human rights re-
gime with three main elements: a Global Law Commission, global laws 
and regulations, and universal civil jurisdiction. 
In the summer of 2009, the U.S. news media was dominated by re-
ports about the BP oil spill.7 The United States Environmental Protection 
Agency Administrator described it as “the largest environmental disaster 
in American history.”8 But although similar events have occurred many 
times over in developing countries, they have not captured the attention 
of the U.S. media in the same way.9 For example, a major oil spill the 
size of the Exxon Valdez disaster has occurred every year for half a cen-
  
to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international assistance 
and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with 
a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant 
by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.”). However, 
“international legal institutions typically only have advisory powers and are unable to ‘make’ states 
take particular action.” Angela M. Banks, CEDAW, Compliance, and Custom: Human Rights En-
forcement in Sub-Saharan Africa, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 781, 782 (2009). 
 5. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 1; Hope Lewis, Embracing Complexity: Human Rights in Criti-
cal Race Feminist Perspective, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 510, 519 (2003) (“Many [transnational 
corporations] have more economic resources at their disposal than the entire budget available to 
some developing countries; they can exert influence that approximates that of a state in some cir-
cumstances.”). 
 6. See Deva, supra note 2, at 3 (“[T]he approach of indirect regulation has failed to deliver 
the desired results.”). 
 7. For example, a search on July 3, 2010 for “BP oil spill 2010” in Google news resulted in 
22,100 hits. 
 8. Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator Jackson: Keep Moving America Forward into Energy 
Independence, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY , http://blog.epa.gov/administrator/2010/06 
/08/administrator-jackson-%e2%80%9ckeep-moving-america-forward-into-energy-independence 
%e2%80%9d/ (last updated Oct. 27, 2010). However, others contend that the “Dust Bowl” of the 
1930s may be the largest environmental disaster on U.S. territory. See, e.g., Ed Stoddard, Is Gulf 
Spill the Worst Ecological Disaster in U.S. History?, REUTERS ENVIRONMENT FORUM (June 22, 
2010, 10:09 AM), http://blogs.reuters.com/environment/2010/06/is-gulf-spill-the-worst-ecological-
disaster-in-u-s-history/. 
 9. A search for “Niger Delta oil spill” in Google news on July 3, 2010 resulted in 154 hits.  
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tury in the Niger Delta.10 Environmental disasters overseas often involve 
a subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, as was the case in the Bhopal disaster 
in which toxic gas leaked from a pesticide plant, killing an estimated 
2,100 people and injuring over 200,000 others.11 Nonetheless, oil spills 
in the Niger Delta and other developing countries—and the harms they 
cause— do not receive the same level of attention in the U.S. media.12 
Environmental catastrophes like the 2010 BP oil spill and the dec-
ades of oil spills in other places like the Niger Delta impinge upon hu-
man rights—such as the rights to life, health, adequate food and housing, 
and clean water.13 Life, health, and other human rights are enumerated, 
for example, in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the 1966 In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and 
other human rights documents.14 In the BP oil spill, eleven people were 
killed in the explosion.15 In some cases in the Niger Delta, oil drilling 
and associated gas flares have made entire villages uninhabitable.16 Oil 
drilling and gas flares have had devastating effects on both the environ-
ment and human health, and have led to convulsions, chromosomal dam-
  
 10. Adam Nossiter, Far From Gulf, a Spill Scourge 5 Decades Old, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 
2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/world/africa/17nigeria.html (“The 
Niger Delta, where the wealth underground is out of all proportion with the poverty on the surface, 
has endured the equivalent of the Exxon Valdez spill every year for 50 years by some estimates.”). 
For details of the amount of oil spilled in the Niger Delta between 1976 and 1996, see Odjuvwued-
erhie Emmanuel Inoni, Douglason Gordon Omotor & Felicia Nkem Adun, The Effect of Oil Spillage 
on Crop Yield and Farm Income in Delta State, Nigeria, 7 J. CENT. EUROPEAN AGRIC. 41, 43 
(2006), available at http://www.agr.hr/jcea/issues/jcea7-1/pdf/jcea71-6.pdf. 
 11. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec., 1984, 634 F. Supp. 
842, 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff’d and modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 12. A search for “Niger Delta oil spill” on July 3, 2010 resulted in less than one percent of the 
hits for “BP oil spill 2010” on the same date although the search is narrower and there has been the 
equivalent of a major spill in the Niger Delta every year for at least 50 years. 
 13. See U.N. Special Representative of the Secretary General, Protect, Respect & Remedy: A 
Framework for Business & Human Rights: Second Addendum, 3, 29, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5/Add.2 
(May 23, 2008) [hereinafter Protect, Respect & Remedy], available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/136/61/PDF/G0813661.pdf?OpenElement. 
 14. ICCPR, supra note 4, at art. 6; ICESCR, supra note 4, at art. 7, 12; Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/Res/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter 
UDHR]. However, there continues to be disagreement about the legitimacy and enforceability of 
economic, social, and cultural rights. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Rethinking Human Rights, 9 INT’L 
LEGAL THEORY 5, 5–6 (2003) (discussing the controversy associated with the extent to which social, 
cultural, and economic rights are accepted). 
 15. Bradley Blackburn, BP Oil Spill: Families Gather to Honor 11 Who Died, Express Frus-
tration With BP, Transocean, ABC NEWS (May 25, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/bp-oil-spill-
transocean-holds-memorial-11-lost/story?id=10739080. 
 16. Factsheet: Shell’s Environmental Devastation in Nigeria, CENTER FOR CONST. RTS., 
http://ccrjustice.org/learn-more/faqs/shell%2526%2523039%3Bs-environmental-devastation-nigeria 
[hereinafter CCR] (last visited Oct. 27, 2010). The devastation was so extensive that Ken Saro-
Wiwa, the leader of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, described the oil drilling 
operations as “an ecological war against the Ogoni.” Fifth Amended Complaint and Demand for 
Jury Trial ¶¶ 1, 53, Wiwa v. Shell Petroleum, No. 96 Civ. 8386 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2009), 
http://ccrjustice.org/files/3.16.09%205th%20Amended%20Complaint.pdf [hereinafter Wiwa Fifth 
Amended Complaint]. 
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age, birth defects, and other serious illnesses.17 The U.S. news was filled 
with pictures of the extreme damage of BP’s spills and yet most people 
in the United States are completely unaware of the Niger Delta disasters. 
However, environmental catastrophes are not the only way that the 
operations of transnational corporations like BP negatively affect human 
rights.18 Transnational corporations, as “economic entit[ies] operating in 
more than one country or [as] a cluster of economic entities operating in 
two or more countries,” help shape the economic, political, social, and 
legal environments in which they operate.19 Transnational corporations 
are a subset of corporations and, therefore, much of the discussion of 
transnational corporations in this Article also applies to domestic corpo-
rations, although there are, of course, important differences.20 
Transnational corporations also impinge on human rights in the la-
bor context.21 One well-known example is the Nike scandal in the 1990s, 
when Life magazine exposed Nike’s involvement with the use of child 
labor in the production of soccer balls by publishing a picture of a child 
assembling Nike soccer balls in Pakistan.22 More recently, underpaid 
workers, including child workers, produced the soccer balls used in the 
2010 World Cup.23 This case of corporate-related human rights abuse— 
thirteen years after the initial Nike scandal—received only minimal me-
dia attention.  
A 2007 U.N. study reviewed 320 alleged cases of corporate-related 
human rights abuses and concluded that corporations affect “the full 
range of human rights” through their acts or omissions.24 The study fo-
  
 17. CCR, supra note 16. 
 18. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 2; Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2.  
 19. Comm’n on Human Rights, Subcomm’n on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
Rep. on its 55th Sess., July 28–Aug. 15, 2003, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 
2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12 
.Rev.2.En. The influence of transnational corporations is discussed infra in Part II. 
 20. See, e.g., Mark Gibney & R. David Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application of United 
States Law and The Protection of Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations to Domestic 
and International Standards, 10 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 123, 126–27 (1996) (discussing “the 
vastly different standards that exist under U.S. law that give [transnational corporations from the 
U.S.] license to treat U.S. citizens in one manner, but allow foreigners to be treated in a completely 
different (and inferior) way”). 
 21. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 2; Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2. 
 22. Richard M. Locke, The Promise and Perils of Globalization: The Case of Nike 11–13 
(Mass. Inst. of Tech. Indus. Performance Ctr. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 02-007, 2002), 
available at http://web.mit.edu/ipc/publications/pdf/02-007.pdf. 
 23. See Michelle Chen, FIFA’s World Cup Having a Ball with Child Labor, COLOR LINES 
(June 11, 2010, 10:42 AM), http://colorlines.com/archives/2010/06/south_africas_world_cup_brims 
_with_broken_promises.html; James Rupert, World Cup Profits Bypass Asian Soccer-Ball Stitchers 
(Update 1), BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (June 9, 2010, 4:39 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
news/2010-06-09/world-cup-profits-bypass-asian-soccer-ball-stitchers-update1-.html; Trina Tocco, 
World Cup Soccer Balls Missed the Goal Set 13 Years Ago: Child Labor, Poverty Wages, Tempo-
rary Workers, COMMONDREAMS.ORG (June 7, 2010, 10:46 AM), http://www.commondreams.org/ 
newswire/2010/06/07-6. 
 24. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 1–3, 29. The cases were posted on the 
Business and Human Rights Resource center webpage (http://www.business-humanrights.org), 
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cused on the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the In-
ternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and In-
ternational Labour Organization Core Conventions.25 These include 
“civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; and labor 
rights.”26 The study found that corporate-related human rights abuses 
take place in all industrial sectors and in all regions of the world.27 In 
some cases, the harms include loss of life.28 
Although corporate-related human rights abuses are not proportion-
ately represented in the U.S. media, scholars and decision-makers are 
aware of the issue.29 So, if scholars and decision-makers have been aware 
of corporate-related human rights abuses for decades at the very least, 
why are there still such wide-scale problems with corporations nega-
tively affecting human rights? This Article argues that the answer is not 
simply a lack of regulations or a lack of enforcement. Instead, it argues 
that part of the answer lies in the conflation of human rights law with 
international human rights law, and the ways that human rights law inter-
sects with corporate law and foreign direct investment law.30 
Addressing the complex problem of human rights abuses by trans-
national corporations requires a comprehensive framework.31 One ave-
nue toward a comprehensive framework is international law; another 
avenue is global law. International law is the law between nation-states 
  
which “is the most comprehensive” and “objective” resource on the intersection of business and 
human rights. Id. at 6. 
 25. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2. See generally ICCPR, supra note 4; 
ICESCR, supra note 4; UDHR, supra note 14; INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LABOUR ORGANIZATION’S FUNDAMENTAL CONVENTIONS 8 (2002), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/documents/publication/wcms 
_095895.pdf. There are eight core International Labour Organization conventions: Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87); Right to Organise 
and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98); Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29); 
Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105); Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 
138); Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182); Equal Remuneration Convention, 
1951 (No. 100); Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111). Id. 
 26. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2. 
 27. Id. Based on the cases reviewed in the U.N. study, the regional breakdown of alleged 
human rights incidents is as follows: Asia & the Pacific – 28%; Africa – 22%; Latin America – 18%; 
Global – 15%; North America – 7%; Europe – 3%; and Middle East – 2%. Id. at 8. 
 28. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 2–4. 
 29. See generally, e.g., JOSEPH, supra note 1; Locke, supra note 22; Protect, Respect & Rem-
edy, supra note 13. 
 30. For a parallel argument addressing the question of why transnational corporations do not 
have obligations under international human rights law, see Iris Halpern, Tracing the Contours of 
Transnational Corporations’ Human Rights Obligations in the Twenty-First Century, 14 BUFF. 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 129, 131 (2008) (positing that the omission of transnational corporations is “a 
product of the systemic separation between international economic development, human rights 
enforcement, and the regulation of private players”). 
 31. See id. at 134 (“The international legal system must be refashioned so as to be capable of 
simultaneously regulating all the numerous important actors vis-à-vis their human rights behavior.”). 
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and, as such, it does not directly regulate transnational corporations.32 
Instead, it regulates the regulators, the nation-states, thereby concentrat-
ing on nation-states and marginalizing issues that do not directly impli-
cate nation-states.33 Since transnational corporations are (by definition) 
not nation-states, they do not fall within the natural scope of international 
law. Further, since transnational corporations operate in multiple juris-
dictions, the laws of any one jurisdiction are not sufficient to govern their 
activities.34  
Global law is an emerging legal order. It is a next iteration of law, 
following the law of nations and international law.35 Global law is nei-
ther superior nor inferior to other legal orders.36 Instead, it presupposes 
the interconnection and interdependency of all legal orders of the world, 
including international law and national law.37 Human rights are a core 
value of global law.38 There are multiple sources of global law, including 
specific economic or other subsectors, and organizational and functional 
networks.39 Lex mercatoria, also known as commercial law, transnational 
law, or the New Law Merchant, is an example of global law.40 Through 
various means, global law provides an opportunity to address corporate-
related human rights abuses, in part because it is not state-centered. 
This Article is part of a larger project. My previous article, Toward 
Global Corporate Citizenship: Reframing Foreign Direct Investment 
Law, argued that the asymmetry and fragmentation of foreign direct in-
  
 32. See PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1–2 (1956). As early as 1956, Philip Jessup 
noted the inadequacy of using “international law” to address issues that arise within the “complex 
interrelated world community.” Id. at 1. Instead, Jessup used the term “‘transnational law’ to include 
all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers.” Id. at 2 (“Both public and 
private international law are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit into such standard 
categories.”). For a more detailed discussion of the term “transnational,” see generally id. Transna-
tional law, thus, may regulate “individuals, corporations, states, organizations of states, or other 
groups.” Id. at 2–3. 
 33. See id. at 11. 
 34. See id. at 4–5; see also Rachel J. Anderson, Toward Global Corporate Citizenship: Re-
framing Foreign Direct Investment Law, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 (2009). 
 35. RAFAEL DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW, at xiv (2010); see also Harold J. Berman, 
World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1617, 1617 (1995). For more on national human rights law, see  
generally UNITED NATIONS, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A SURVEY OF NHRI PRACTICES 
(2008), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/OHCHR-National-Human-Rights-
Institutions-practices-Apr-2008.doc.  
 36. See DOMINGO, supra note 35, at 147. 
 37. Id.; see also Ralf Michaels, The True Lex Mercatoria: Law Beyond the State, 14 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 447 (2007) (arguing that “the dichotomy of anational law and state law 
is false”). 
 38. DOMINGO, supra note 35 , at 142–44. 
 39. Gunther Teubner, ‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL 
LAW WITHOUT A STATE 3, 3–4 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997). See generally id. for a discussion of 
global law.  
 40. Id. at 3. Lex mercatoria is also defined as “the transnational law of economic transac-
tions.” Id.; see also ANA M. LÓPEZ RODRÍGUEZ, LEX MERCATORIA AND HARMONIZATION OF 
CONTRACT LAW IN THE EU 90 (2003) (defining global law as “a body of rules, different in origin 
and content, created by the community of merchants to serve the needs of international trade”).  
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vestment law encourages excesses by transnational corporations.41 That 
article proposed transforming the theories and practices of voluntary 
Global Corporate Citizenship into a mandatory legal framework and de-
veloping a legal theory of Global Corporate Citizenship that re-
conceptualizes the role of transnational corporations in the global econ-
omy. This Article builds on Toward Global Corporate Citizenship and 
attempts to reimagine human rights law.42 It argues for the development 
of a global law regime as a sub-category of human rights law, distinct 
from international human rights law, and proposes a global institution, 
global laws, and global enforcement to regulate transnational corpora-
tions and help fill gaps in human rights law.43 This Article makes that 
argument in three stages.  
Part I, Limits of a State-Centered Human Rights Regime, argues for 
the re-remembering of human rights law as the super-category and inter-
national human rights law as one of several possible sub-categories of 
human rights law. In the wake of the dramatic expansion of international 
human rights law in the post-World War II era, it came to be thought of 
as synonymous with human rights law. This conflation of human rights 
law and international human rights law has inhibited the development of 
other sub-categories of human rights law such as global human rights 
law and national human rights law. Although international human rights 
law has achieved significant progress, the state-centered human rights 
regime is limited, and, in the absence of other forms of human rights law, 
leads to the under-regulation of transnational corporations as a result of 
state resistance, impotency, and complicity. Part I proposes decoupling 
and distinguishing between human rights law and international human 
rights law to allow for the development of other forms of human rights 
law, including global human rights law. 
Part II, Transnational Corporations Need Dedicated Regulation, 
posits that transnational corporations require dedicated regulation under 
human rights law that goes beyond the ambit of international human 
rights law. International human rights law requires states to enact and 
enforce laws to protect human rights within their jurisdiction. However, 
international human rights law alone is an insufficient tool with which to 
regulate transnational corporations when their economic, political, and 
  
 41. See Anderson, supra note 34, at 6. 
 42. This article attempts to respond to the challenge identified by Philip Alston in The ‘Not-a-
Cat’ Syndrome: Can the International Human Rights Regime Accommodate Non-State Actors?, in 
NON-STATE ACTORS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 4 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) (“The challenge that [the 
state-centered focus of the international human rights regime] lays down is one of re-imagining, as 
the social scientists would put it, the nature of the human rights regime and the relationships among 
the different actors within it. Lawyers, not being noted for their willingness to depart from prece-
dents, might prefer to see the task in terms for re-interpreting existing concepts and procedures rather 
than re-imagining.”). 
 43. Sarah Joseph has argued, “Ultimately, a preferable approach might be for all nations to 
agree on international minimum human rights standards for TNCs, which could be incorporated into 
national legislation and enforced by domestic courts.” JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 153. 
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legal influence exceeds that of the countries in which they operate. The 
interests of states in preserving sovereignty inhibit the development of 
comprehensive multijurisdictional international human rights enforce-
ment mechanisms. Finally, the importance of human rights as core values 
contrasted with the inadequacy of international human rights law as the 
sole tool to protect them at the global level, demonstrate the need for 
protection and enforcement of these rights in multiple forms of human 
rights law.  
Part III, Global Regulation of Transnational Corporations, sets out a 
proposal for the development of global human rights law as a sub-
category of human rights law that could address the problem of corpo-
rate-related human rights abuses. This proposal has three main compo-
nents: creation of a Global Law Commission, development of global 
laws, and implementation of universal civil jurisdiction. A primary pur-
pose of the Global Law Commission would be to develop global human 
rights law regulations and legislation to prevent and address corporate-
related human rights abuses. The Global Law Commission would de-
velop model global regulations and laws informed by theories of Global 
Corporate Citizenship and promote their enactment. Global regulations 
and laws could be enforceable via multiple avenues, including national 
courts, alternative dispute resolution, and universal civil jurisdiction for 
corporate-related human rights abuses. However, this proposal does not 
preclude the creation of a global court or other global mechanism for 
adjudication or alternative dispute resolution. 
I. LIMITS OF A STATE-CENTERED HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 
International human rights law categorizes all actors on the global 
stage as either state actors or non-state actors.44 For the purposes of in-
ternational human rights law, non-state actors can be defined only by 
their relationship to the state.45 This state-centered focus inhibits an accu-
rate analysis of corporate-related human rights abuses and limits the de-
velopment of measures with which these issues can be addressed.46 In 
light of these weaknesses, this Article argues for the development of 
other forms of human rights law.  
Although states are no longer assumed to be the only actors in the 
international arena, modern human rights law remains state-centered.47 
  
 44. Alston, supra note 42, at 3.  
 45. Id. at 3–4. 
 46. See id. at 4 (“[S]uch a uni-dimensional or monochromatic way of viewing the world is not 
only misleading, but also makes it much more difficult to adapt the human rights regime in order to 
take adequate account of the fundamental changes that have occurred in recent years.”). 
 47. See Deva, supra note 2, at 1 (“The conventional international framework for protection of 
human rights is state-centric; it obligates primarily states to promote, and not violate, human 
rights.”); PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 209 
(7th ed. 1997) (“[E]very individual has certain inalienable and legally enforceable rights protecting 
him or her against state interference and the abuse of power by governments.”); see also Rafael 
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This means that when we think of human rights law, we think primarily 
of international human rights law. Modern international human rights 
law is anchored in the series of international declarations and conven-
tions that were generated in the decades following the fall of the Third 
Reich and the end of World War II.48 The atrocities perpetuated by the 
Nazi state against its own citizens and those of other countries were still 
fresh in the minds of the policy makers who organized the Nuremburg 
trials and drafted and signed the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.49 This explains, in part, the post-World War II focus on state ac-
tion.  
However, although corporations were often complicit and, in many 
cases, actively involved in human rights abuses under the Nazi regime 
and in many other contexts, the emerging international human rights 
regime did not incorporate direct rules governing transnational corpora-
tions.50 Although some argue that the primary focus of international deci-
sion-makers in the post-World War II period was responding to the 
atrocities of the Nazi regime, the reasons more likely lie in the complexi-
ties of political machinations and conflicts of interest set in a particular 
historical context.51 The exclusion of transnational corporations from 
international human rights law is not inevitable, but rather results from 
historical events, flawed assumptions, and lack of political will among 
some influential policy makers.52 
  
Domingo, The Crisis of International Law, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1543, 1549–50 (2009). For 
a discussion of the nation-state paradigm and its history, see id. at 1556–66. 
 48. See Austen L. Parrish, Changing Territoriality, Fading Sovereignty, and Development of 
Indigenous Rights, 31 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 291, 296–97 (2007). The post-World War II period 
marks the beginning of broad international action in the area of human rights. See MALANCZUK, 
supra note 47, at 209. Prior to World War II, actions addressing human rights concerns tended to be 
focused on specific regions, groups, or abuses. Id. 
 49. See LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 1 (1990).  
 50. See Halpern, supra note 30, at 130–31. 
 51. See Mark Mazower, The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933–1950, 47 HISTORICAL 
J. 379, 380, 397 (2004) (“It does no service to the cause of human rights to disguise the political 
struggles and conflicts of interest that accompanied their emergence into the international arena. On 
the contrary, a better understanding of that story, their relationship to prior rights regimes, and their 
dependence on the international balance of power may help us recognize their true weight and 
worth.”); see also Kenneth Cmiel, The Recent History of Human Rights, 109 AM. HIST. REV. 117, 
119 (2004) (“While university-based historians such as Paul Lauren, Lynn Hunt, and Jeffrey 
Wasserstrom have addressed the subject, journalists, legal scholars, political activists, and political 
scientists have still done far more of this history writing. The field remains refreshingly inchoate.”).  
 52. See ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 111–14 (2004) (arguing that modern international law is deeply and funda-
mentally shaped by imperialism and colonialism). Colonial trading companies, the predecessors of 
modern transnational corporations, were arms of the state and, therefore, did not require a separate 
body of governing law. Their purpose was to further political, legal, economic, and social goals. For 
example, the Dutch West India Company was “started as a move in the war game” and “[t]he aim 
and objective of the Company had from the first been to carry on active war with Spain.” Hugh E. 
Egerton, The Transference of Colonial Power to the United Provinces and England 728, 749, in 4 
THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY: THE THIRTY YEARS’ WAR, 749 (A.W. Ward, G.W. Prothero & 
Stanley Leathes eds., 1906). The shareholders of the Dutch West India Company were five Dutch 
government institutions, the Dutch legislature made annual payment to the Dutch West India Com-
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Protected from the reach of international human rights law, transna-
tional corporations continue to impinge upon human rights. The most 
common labor-related rights that the operations of transnational corpora-
tions affect include “the right to work (34%), [the] right to just and fa-
vorable remuneration (30%), the right to a safe work environment (31%), 
and the right to rest and leisure (25%).”53 For example, in the late 1990s, 
an Ernst and Young54 report on a Nike subcontractor in Vietnam claimed 
that concentrations of a chemical solvent, chemical releases, and excess 
dust in the shoe plant (in each case, many multiples above the allowed 
levels) had caused extensive harm to the workers’ human rights.55 Spe-
cifically, workers suffered from respiratory ailments and skin and heart 
disease that were allegedly caused by the health and safety violations at 
the factory.56 The Ernst and Young report also stated that the employees 
were forced to work more hours than allowed by Vietnamese law.57 
As mentioned above, not only do corporate-related human rights 
abuses take place in the labor context, they are also linked to environ-
mental harms. Those human rights affected include the right to physical 
health and to an adequate standard of living, and the right to life, liberty 
and personal security.58 Corporate-related human rights harms are often 
caused by pollution, contamination, and environmental degradation.59 
For example, the plaintiffs in Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC60 alleged that Rio 
Tinto’s Panguna Mine in Papua New Guinea polluted the Kawerong-
Jaba River with waste and poisoned the air with dust and emissions from 
a copper concentrator.61 The plaintiffs asserted that this air and water 
pollution led to an increase in respiratory infections and asthma, and that 
the decreased food supply due to crop damage and the deaths of tradi-
tional sources of food like fish led to health problems in the local popula-
  
pany, and the Dutch legislature promised to provide the Dutch West India Company with a fleet of 
ships in the event of a serious war. Id. at 749–50. 
 53. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 11. 
 54. Ernst and Young is a global accounting firm that provides assurance, tax, transaction, and 
advisory services. See About Us, ERNST AND YOUNG, http://www.ey.com/US/en/About-us (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2010). 
 55. Locke, supra note 22, at 13; see also Steven Greenhouse, Nike Shoe Plant in Vietnam is 
Called Unsafe for Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1997, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1997/11/08/business/nike-shoe-plant-in-vietnam-is-called-unsafe-forworkers.html?scp=1&sq 
=nike%20shoe%20plant%20in%20vietnam%20is%20called%20unsafe&st=cse. 
 56. Locke, supra note 22, at 13. 
 57. Greenhouse, supra note 55 (stating that employees were forced to work 65 hours a week 
for $10). Over 9,000 workers were employed at the factory. Locke, supra note 22, at 13. 
 58. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2. 
 59. See id. 
 60. 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 456 
F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), withdrawn and superseded on reh’g in part, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 
2007), reh’g en banc granted, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007). On October 26, 2010, an en banc panel 
of the Ninth Circuit referred the case to a mediator to “explore the possibility of mediation.” Sarei v. 
Rio Tinto, 02-cv-56256 (9th Cir. Oct. 26, 2010). The mediator is scheduled “to report to the en banc 
court within twenty-eight (28) days as to whether mediation should proceed or whether this case 
should be returned to the en banc court.” Id.  
 61. Id. at 1124 & n.31. 
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tion.62 Corporate-related human rights abuses harm not only individuals 
but also entire communities.63 
In addition to direct abuses such as under-compensation or chemical 
spills, abuses by transnational corporations create ripple effects that lead 
to additional harms.64 For example, exploitative compensation practices 
can contribute to harassment and sexual abuse of women.65 The use of 
child labor affects enjoyment of the right to education and, in some 
cases, the rights to health and even life.66 By way of illustration, children 
between the ages of five and seventeen are employed at vanilla orchards 
in Madagascar.67 They are among the twenty-eight percent of children in 
Madagascar who are employed in the agriculture and fishing industries.68 
These children are unable to enjoy the right to education because they 
work six to seven hours a day for approximately twelve cents a day.69 
Corporations also contribute to or benefit from indirect involvement 
in human rights abuses by third parties—including governments, other 
businesses, and individuals.70 For example, the Swedish Company 
Lundin Oil AB, together with Sudapet Ltd.—which is wholly owned by 
the Sudanese government—has been accused of complicity in war 
crimes and crimes against humanity perpetrated by government security 
forces.71 Most of the indirect cases are alleged in Africa, Asia and the 
Pacific, Latin America, and the Middle East.72 
Even though we tend to think of human rights in terms of interna-
tional human rights law—that is, in a post-1948, post-Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights context—human dignity and other concepts under-
lying human rights predate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and even predate the nation state. Louis Henken,73 a leading international 
  
 62. Id. 
 63. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 4, 29. 
 64. Id. at 3, 29. 
 65. Lewis, supra note 5, at 519 (“Transnational corporations exploit the low-wage status of 
women (often women of color) and, in doing so, create new avenues for sexual abuse and harass-
ment.”); see also Nike Admits Abuse at Indonesian Plants, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2001, 13:55 GMT), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1184103.stm (reporting that underpaid workers in a Nike 
plant in Indonesia, who are 85% women, have reported being coerced into sex and being fondled by 
managers). 
 66. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 3. 
 67. Dan McDougall, Bitter Plight of the Vanilla Trade Children, THE SUNDAY TIMES (Mar. 
14, 2010), http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/africa/article7060962.ece. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 4. 
 71. EUROPEAN COAL. ON OIL IN SUDAN, UNPAID DEBT: THE LEGACY OF LUNDIN, PETRONAS 
AND OMV IN BLOCK 5A, SUDAN 1997-2003, at 10 (2010), available at http://www.ecosonline.org/ 
reports/2010/UNPAID_DEBT_fullreportweb.pdf. (“[T]here are grounds to investigate whether the 
Consortium provided financial and material support to the security agencies that were responsible 
for the commission of international crimes and gross violations of human rights.”). 
 72. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 15. 
 73. Louis Henkin (1917-2010) was a professor of law at Columbia University, a president of 
the American Society of International Law, and held many important positions over the course of his 
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law and human rights scholar, defined human rights as “legitimate, valid, 
[and] justified claims” of individuals and communities upon society.74 
Although human rights are claims or entitlements that can be asserted, 
they are not always coexistent with legal rights.75 Human rights arise on 
the basis of a person’s humanity and do not require anything more than 
the nature of a human being to exist; legal rights are government created 
and require a government or other institutional act to exist.76 Thus, hu-
man rights may exist, even when law does not yet protect them.  
A. Underregulation of Transnational Corporations 
Modern human rights law does not generally directly regulate trans-
national corporations. International human rights agreements are—by 
definition—agreements between nation-states.77 International human 
rights documents range from recording understandings of human rights 
and human dignity, to setting out aspirational goals, to establishing re-
quirements and guidelines for state actors.78 The idea is that state signa-
tories of international agreements will enact laws that protect human 
rights.79 Such laws would also apply to domestic and transnational corpo-
rations where appropriate.80  
The exclusion of transnational corporations from the international 
human rights regime puts the burden on states to enact and enforce laws 
that protect human rights.81 However, this expectation, although arguably 
correct in principle, does not account for realities that make state en-
  
life, including at the State Department, the United Nations, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration. 
Louis Henkin, COLUM. L. SCH., http://www.law.columbia.edu/fac/Louis_Henkin (last visited Dec. 
20, 2010). Henkin was a prolific and influential scholar and was “credited with founding the study of 
human rights law and inspiring generations of legal scholars.” Louis Henkin: Preeminent Scholar in 
Constitutional and International Law, COLUM. L. SCH., 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/louis_henkin/55703 (last visited Dec. 20, 2010). 
 74. HENKIN, supra note 49, at 2; see also id. at 2–5 (providing a more detailed discussion of 
this conception of human rights); Rubin, supra note 14, at 9 (“[H]uman rights must be rights, that is, 
they must represent some claim or entitlement that can be asserted by the human beings in ques-
tion.”). 
 75. See Rubin, supra note 14, at 9 for a discussion of the difference between human rights and 
legal rights. 
 76. See id. at 8–9. 
 77. See Domingo, supra note 47, at 1549 (quoting HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 320 
(Max Knight trans., 1967)). 
 78. For example, at the time it was passed by the United Nations General Assembly, most 
states did not regard the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as legally binding. MALANCZUK, 
supra note 47, at 213. However, in the time since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was 
passed some of its provisions may have become binding customary international law. Id. (discussing 
the resolution passed at the United Nations Conference on Human Rights at Teheran in 1968 “pro-
claiming, inter alia, that ‘the Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . constitutes an obligation for 
the members of the international community.’” (alteration in original)). 
 79. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2; ICESCR, supra note 4, art. 2. 
 80. See Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized World, 25 B.C. INT’L & 
COMP. L. REV. 273, 305 (2002) (suggesting that, under the ICESCR, states will be held responsible 
for controlling non-state actors “over which they exercise jurisdiction”). 
 81. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 4, art. 2; ICESCR, supra note 4, art. 2. 
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forcement improbable at best and completely unrealistic at worst.82 For 
example, developing countries have a disincentive to enact and enforce 
laws to protect human rights and remedy abuses because “developing 
countries compete among themselves for a limited pool of investment.”83 
This environment of competition leads governments to make different 
choices about legislation and enforcement than might be the case if they 
were working in concert with other governments.84 This situation leaves 
transnational corporations under-regulated.  
Under-regulation of transnational corporations is problematic be-
cause it encourages decision-making that results in corporate-related 
human rights abuses.85 Although transnational corporations are subject to 
the laws of multiple jurisdictions, the decisions that guide the acts of 
transnational corporations are, in practice, rarely exposed to judicial 
scrutiny.86 Only a small percentage of alleged corporate-related abuses 
make it into court, and even fewer result in an outcome that would create 
incentives for corporations to change their business practices to reduce 
negative effects on human rights.87  
There are at least five ways to address the problem of corporate-
related human rights abuses: laws, pressure by consumers and non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), self-regulation, socially responsible 
investment, and enforcement.88 These can be categorized into legal and 
non-legal remedies. Nonetheless, in their current forms, each of these 
avenues is insufficient.  
Legal measures include legislation and litigation. While domestic 
and international laws do exist, they are fragmented and are often not 
enforced.89 In addition, many plaintiffs do not have the financial re-
sources to pursue legal remedies. As a result, most cases of alleged viola-
tions never make it to court. Reaching a settlement often first requires the 
incentive of a pending court case. Even then, there is a possibility that 
  
 82. See Deva, supra note 2, at 3 (“[T]he approach of indirect regulation has failed to deliver 
the desired results.”); Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Re-
sponsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 448 (2001) (“Without some international legal standards, we will 
likely continue to witness both excessive claims made against such actors for their responsibility and 
counterclaims by corporate actors against such accountability.”). 
 83. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties that Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 674 (1998). 
 84. See id. (suggesting that the environment of competition influences the policies adopted by 
developing countries). 
 85. See JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 153 (arguing that measures are needed to incentivize transna-
tional corporations to adopt better practices with regard to human rights). 
 86. See id. (explaining that the human rights abuses by transnational corporations actually 
subjected to transnational litigation represent “only the tip of the iceberg”). 
 87. See id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. at 8–12. 
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the plaintiffs may not meet all jurisdictional, substantive, and evidentiary 
hurdles—which are often substantial in these types of cases.90  
Non-legal measures can contribute to filling the gaps in law and en-
forcement. These measures include external incentives, such as public 
pressure and socially responsible investment, and internal incentives, 
such as self-regulation.91 Pressure by consumers and NGOs has achieved 
some high profile successes.92 However, this option is limited by the 
need for abuses to be sufficiently widespread or public, or both, to come 
to the attention of consumers and NGOs, at which point substantial 
harms have often already occurred.93 Socially responsible investment 
offers shareholders an opportunity to avoid financing transnational cor-
porations with questionable practices.94 However, socially responsible 
investment itself does not prevent other people from investing in compa-
nies that are less socially responsible. In addition, the effectiveness of 
socially responsible investment remains disputed.95  
The good works for goodwill model underlies more recent devel-
opments in scholarship such as corporate citizenship and enlightened 
shareholder value.96 The essence of the good works for goodwill model 
is that, although good works may be more costly from a short-term per-
spective, they have a beneficial effect on profits from a long-term per-
spective.97 The good works for goodwill model harkens back to issues 
raised in cases like Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,98 A.P. Smith Manufactur-
  
 90. For a discussion of some of these hurdles, see Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Social 
Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 764–71 (2002). 
 91. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 153. 
 92. See Halpern, supra note 30, at 135 (“Currently, the most acute pressure felt by TNCs to 
modify their behavior results from concerted NGO and consumer action campaign activity.”). 
 93. For example, in the Nike case, the underpayment of the workers in Indonesia “became 
publicized through the skillful use of media by several NGOs” and reported in “The New Republic, 
Rolling Stone, The New York Times, Foreign Affairs, and The Economist.” Locke, supra note 22, at 
10–11. However, this practice had gone on for several years before it was brought to the attention of 
the public. See id. (noting that the practice was taking place in the early 1990s and was not discon-
tinued until the mid-1990s). For a discussion of other examples of successful applications of pres-
sure by consumers and NGOs, see id. at 18–19. 
 94. See Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets: The Conflicting 
Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS. LAW. 681, 690 (2002). 
 95. See PAUL HAWKEN & THE NATURAL CAPITAL INSTITUTE, SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE 
INVESTING: HOW THE SRI INDUSTRY HAS FAILED TO RESPOND TO PEOPLE WHO WANT TO INVEST 
WITH CONSCIENCE AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO CHANGE IT 16 (2004) [hereinafter HAWKEN & 
NCI], available at http://www.community-wealth.org/_pdfs/articles-publications/sri/report-
harkin.pdf. 
 96. See generally DAVID LOGAN, DELWIN ROY & LAURIE REGELBRUGGE, GLOBAL 
CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP: RATIONALE AND STRATEGIES (1997) (discussing Global Corporate Citi-
zenship); David Millon, Enlightened Shareholder Value, Social Responsibility, and the Redefinition 
of Corporate Purpose Without Law (Wash. & Lee Pub. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper 
No. 2010-11, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1625750 
(discussing enlightened shareholder value). 
 97. See Millon, supra note 96, at 1–2. 
 98. 170 N.W. 668, 683–84 (Mich. 1919) (examining when shareholders challenged the 
authority of the board of directors to prioritize philanthropic contributions over profit maximization). 
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ing Co. v. Barlow,99 and Shlensky v. Wrigley100 with which U.S. law stu-
dents and corporate law scholars alike are familiar.101 The good works 
for goodwill model essentially shifts the framework from a short-term to 
a long-term emphasis but retains a focus on profit-maximization as a 
primary goal.102  
Finally, the level of judicial review of business decisions in the 
United States has global implications because approximately one-fifth of 
the top 100 non-financial transnational corporations are located in the 
United States. Currently, the main forum for corporate-related human 
rights abuse cases is also the United States.103 U.S. courts subscribe to a 
doctrine of minimal judicial review of the substance of business deci-
sions called the business judgment rule.104 This rule presents a particu-
larly problematic hurdle for enforcement in cases of corporate-related 
human rights abuses because it means that they, too, are subjected to 
only minimal judicial review.  
B. State Resistance, Impotency, and Complicity 
To date, international human rights law has had a limited trickle-
down effect on corporate-related human rights abuses. Not all countries 
have signed on to all international human rights agreements. For exam-
ple, the United States has ratified only seventeen of fifty-one interna-
tional human rights agreements, and five of the agreements ratified by 
the United States relate to terrorism.105 In addition, ratification of an in-
  
 99. 98 A.2d 581, 585–87 (N.J. 1953) (discussing shareholders who challenged the authority of 
the board of directors to make a contribution to a university). 
 100. 237 N.E.2d 776, 778 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (discussing shareholders that challenged the 
authority of the board of directors to act “for a reason or reasons contrary and wholly unrelated to the 
business interests of the corporation”). 
 101. It is worth noting here that Geoffrey P. Miller argues that although the narratives of these 
situations are often told as charitable corporate giving cases, these narratives did not accurately 
reflect the underlying motives and issues in these cases. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Narrative 
and Truth in Judicial Opinions: Corporate Charitable Giving Cases (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-56, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1495069. 
 102. See generally Millon, supra note 96, at 4 (discussing corporate purpose and the shift from 
short-term shareholder value to be broadened to encompass nonshareholder interest as well). 
 103. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 21 (“Most of the transnational human rights cases against corpo-
rations have arisen under the Alien Tort Claims Act [ATCA] in the United States.”). However, the 
ability to bring claims against corporations under the Alien Tort Statute was recently called into 
question in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that (1) 
customary international law governs the scope of Alien Tort Statute liability, (2) in matters of first 
impression, the Alien Tort Statute does not confer jurisdiction over claims against corporations, and 
(3) corporate defendants were not subject to Alien Tort Statue liability because corporations were 
not subject to liability under customary international law). 
 104. The business judgment rule is based on the presumption that directors possess more ex-
pertise than judges when it comes to making business decisions and so should not be second-guessed 
by judges as long as appropriate procedures have been followed in the decision-making process. See, 
e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 361–62 (Del.Ch. 2000); Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812–13 (Del. 1984); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 
1981).  
 105. See Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties – USA, U. MINN. HUM. RTS. 
LIBR., http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/ratification-USA.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2010). 
File: Anderson_FinalProof_12711.doc Created on: 1/27/11 6:12 PM Last Printed: 1/28/11 7:16 AM 
198 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1 
 
ternational human rights agreement does not automatically ensure that a 
country will enact comprehensive laws to implement the agreements to 
which it is a party.106  
Further, even if enacted, such laws may not achieve the goals of the 
agreement under which they were mandated. For example, the United 
States ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in 1994.107 However, in its Oc-
tober 2000 report on efforts made to implement the CERD, the U.S. gov-
ernment admitted that enactment of laws has been insufficient to fulfill 
the goals of the CERD.108  
There are numerous factors that affect states’ ability to protect hu-
man rights.109 These include historical, economic, and institutional con-
straints as well as weak legal systems, regime change, wars, politics, and 
geopolitical power plays.110 Some states—for example, failed states 
(states that have collapsed and can no longer perform basic functions)—
are unable to protect human rights.111 In some cases, developing coun-
tries do not have the political will or legal processes to protect human 
rights.112  
In other cases, states actively resist the development, implementa-
tion, and enforcement of the international human rights regime.113 Even 
at the inception of the modern international human rights regime, politi-
  
 106. See Mazower, supra note 51, at 379 (“To many people, [human rights] are honoured in 
the breach, an ideal which statesmen pay lip-service to but flout in practice.”).  
 107. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Reports Submitted by States 
Paties Under Article 9 of the Convention: Third Periodic Reports of States Due in 1999, ¶ 3, U.N. 
Doc. CERD/C/351/Add.1 (Oct. 10, 2000) [hereinafter United States 2000 CERD Report], available 
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100294.pdf (combining the first three periodic 
reports of the United States). It may seem surprising that the United States has ratified CERD since 
the United States has not ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. See Ratification of International 
Human Rights Treaties – USA, U. MINN. HUM. RTS. LIBR., http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research 
/ratification-USA.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2010). It is worth noting that this exception—U.S. 
ratification of an international human rights agreement—was prompted by the very public presenta-
tion of petition to the United Nations in 1947 by W.E.B. Du Bois on behalf of the National Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Colored People. Mazower, supra note 51, at 395. 
 108. United States 2000 CERD Report, supra note 108, at 18–21. Reasons given in the report 
for the inadequate implementation of the CERD include inadequate enforcement of existing laws, 
inefficient use of data, economic disparities, and lack of access to educational opportunities, tech-
nology, and high technology skills. Id. at 19–20. In addition, the report notes that persistent dis-
crimination is a primary factor affecting the implementation of laws designed to eliminate discrimi-
nation. Id. at 19–21. Ironic. However, it is worth noting that the section on factors affecting imple-
mentation has been reduced to less than a page in the 2007 report and no longer gives discrimination 
as a reason for persistent discrimination despite the enactment of laws. See Periodic Report of the 
U.S., U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Periodic Report of the U.S., ¶¶ 52–
54 (April 2007), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/83517.pdf.  
 109. See Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the Relationship?, 36 
GEO. J. INT’L L. 809, 943–44 (2005). 
 110. See id. 
 111. See id. at 858. 
 112. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 11. 
 113. See Mazower, supra note 51, at 393. 
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cal decision-makers attempted to limit the scope, implementation, and 
enforcement of international human rights law.114 For example, during 
the establishment of the United Nations in the 1940s, the U.S. Congress 
actively took steps to protect U.S. domestic jurisdiction and prevent di-
rect applicability of the U.N. Charter’s human rights provisions.115  
As a result of U.S. and British concerns about national jurisdiction, 
a domestic jurisdiction clause was incorporated into the U.N. Charter.116 
Article 2 of the U.N. Charter states that “[n]othing contained in the pre-
sent Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters 
which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall 
require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the pre-
sent Charter.”117 The inclusion of this domestic jurisdiction clause effec-
tively circumscribed the ability of the U.N. Charter to serve as a direct 
basis for effective implementation and enforcement of the emerging 
post-World War II international human rights regime.118 
The state-centered focus of international human rights law relegates 
to the periphery complex relationships between public and private ac-
tors—as well as relationships between private actors, and individuals and 
communities.119 For example, the real and perceived need for foreign 
capital creates incentives for states to establish an investment climate that 
is attractive to transnational corporations.120 In response, states that are 
looking to foreign direct investment to provide capital and know-how for 
infrastructure development may choose not to monitor or enforce laws 
and regulations that would increase the cost of operating within their 
borders.121 
In some cases, states are also complicit in corporate-related human 
rights abuses122 and, therefore, have a disincentive to implement and en-
force protection from and remedies for human rights abuses. For exam-
ple, in response to the Niger Delta disasters discussed above, Ken Saro-
Wiwa, a businessman, novelist, television producer, and former govern-
ment official, spoke out against land appropriation, pollution, and other 
alleged negative effects of the acts of multinational oil companies, in-
cluding Royal Dutch/Shell.123 In November 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa and 
  
 114. See id. (“The higher human rights moved up the agenda, the greater the pressure for a 
further limitation on the new [United Nation]’s ability to intervene in the domestic affairs of member 
states.” (emphasis added)). 
 115. See id. 
 116. See id. at 393. 
 117. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
 118. See Mazower, supra note 51, at 393 (discussing how Article 2 undermined the scope and 
effectiveness of the U.N. Charter’s ability to serve as the basis for an effective human rights regime). 
 119. See Hope Lewis, Transnational Dimensions of Racial Identity: Reflecting on Race, the 
Global Economy, and the Human Rights Movement at 60, 24 MD. J. INT’L L. 296, 306 (2009). 
 120. See id. at 306–07. 
 121. See id. 
 122. See generally Wiwa Fifth Amended Complaint, supra note 16. 
 123. See id. at 2. 
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five other men were beaten, and denied food, water and bedding for sev-
eral days.124 On November 10, 1995, the six men were hanged after a 
“special military trial” based on fabricated charges.125 The Royal Dutch 
Shell consortium had knowledge of these acts and gave its consent and 
support.126 Royal Dutch/Shell made payments to the military police, con-
tracted for the purchase of weapons supplied to the Nigerian police and 
military, exchanged information with and provided logistical support to 
the Nigerian police and military, and participated in the planning and 
coordination of raids and terror campaigns in Ogoni and the Niger 
Delta.127 At one point, the Nigerian subsidiary, a member of the Royal 
Dutch Shell consortium, publicly praised the working relationship be-
tween the subsidiary and the Nigerian Police Force.128 
Even in cases in which states are not acting in collusion with trans-
national corporations, the state-centered human rights regime does not 
provide sufficient incentives for transnational corporations to respect 
human rights. In the 2007 U.N. study of cases of alleged corporate-
related human rights abuses discussed above, two of the main contexts in 
which transnational corporations impinged upon human rights were labor 
and the environment.129 In most of the cases reviewed in the U.N. study, 
each alleged instance of corporate-related human rights abuse affected at 
least one hundred people, and the numbers were often much higher.130 
For example, in one case, one alleged instance of corporate-related hu-
man rights abuse affected approximately 60,000 people.131  
Although the international human rights regime has made progress 
since the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, state resistance continues to inhibit devel-
opment of an implementable and enforceable human rights regime do-
mestically and internationally.132 States, which bear the responsibility for 
implementing and enforcing international human rights law, fail to ade-
  
 124. See id. at 3, 17. 
 125. Id. (“Defendants Royal Dutch/Shell, together with the military regime governing Nigeria, 
acting through the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited . . . , and acting with 
other agents and co-conspirators have, in the past and continuing through the present, used force and 
intimidation to silence any opposition to their activities in Nigeria which includes the exploitation of 
the petroleum resources of the Delta and spoliation of the environment there.”).  
 126. Id. at 2 (“The executions of Ken Saro-Wiwa, John Kpuinen, Saturday Doobee, Felix 
Nuate, Daniel Gbokoo, and Dr. Barinem Kiobel and the imprisonment and torture of Michael Tema 
Vizor by the Nigerian military junta and the campaign to falsely accuse them were carried out with 
the knowledge, consent, and/or support of Defendants Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell 
Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c., . . . and their agents and officers, as part of a pattern of 
collaboration and/or conspiracy between [Royal Dutch/Shell] and the military junta of Nigeria to 
violently and ruthlessly suppress any opposition to Royal Dutch/Shell’s conduct in its exploitation of 
oil and natural gas resources in Ogoni and in the Niger Delta.”). 
 127. See id. at 8–9. 
 128. Id. at 13. 
 129. Protect, Respect & Remedy, supra note 13, at 2. 
 130. Id. at 13–14. 
 131. Id. at 13. 
 132. See Peerenboom, supra note 109, at 824. 
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quately do so. At the same time, the focus on international human rights 
law diverts attention and energy that could be used to develop alternative 
areas of human rights law. State resistance takes many forms including 
non-ratification, reservations to international agreements, non-
compliance, and even withdrawal from international agreements.133 The 
extent to which states make reservations to international human rights 
treaties undermines the effectiveness of those treaties.134  
C. Extraterritorial Application of Domestic Law 
The combination of sovereignty and territorial integrity imbues 
states with jurisdiction within a state’s territories.135 Generally, under 
modern international law, sovereign states have the jurisdiction to make 
and enforce laws within their own territories.136 This also means that, 
generally, states may not interfere in affairs that are within the jurisdic-
tion of another state or in another state’s exercise of its authority within 
its jurisdiction.137  
States also exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction.138 In fact, there is an 
increasing trend toward extraterritoriality.139 Familiar examples include 
exterritorial application of antitrust, securities, and merger and takeover 
laws.140 However, the extraterritorial application of domestic laws is 
problematic.141 For example, the checks and balances that develop out of 
mutual obligations, such as those embodied in international treaties, do 
not constrain extraterritorial application of domestic law.142 Individual 
nations are able to use their domestic laws to influence international pol-
icy in a non-transparent manner.143 Such laws are not first subjected to 
  
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. However, ratification alone is not inherently correlated with increased protections 
for human rights.  
 135. For a discussion of sovereignty, territoriality, and jurisdiction, see Domingo, supra note 
47, at 1556–76. 
 136. See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: 
THE SEARCH FOR A NEW CORPORATE PERSONALITY 175 (1993). 
 137. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
 138. See BLUMBERG, supra note 136, at 175–77 (discussing the bases for extraterritoriality). 
Blumberg differentiates between home and host country territoriality. Id. at 177–91. For examples of 
home and host country extraterritoriality, see generally id. For a brief history of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in the international criminal context, see Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The 
Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L 
L. REV. 1, 3–11 (2007). 
 139. Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 815, 818 (2009). For a discussion of U.S. attempts to regulate transnational corporations, see 
Mark B. Baker, Tightening the Toothless Vise: Codes of Conduct and the American Multinational 
Enterprise, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 89, 107–18 (2001). 
 140. BLUMBERG, supra note 136, at 192–93. 
 141. See Parrish, supra note 139, at 820. 
 142. Id. at 846. For a response to arguments that extraterritorial laws encourage international 
lawmaking, see id. at 871–72.  
 143. See id. at 846, 857, 860, 862. 
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public debate and discourse at the global level, which poses a threat to 
democratic sovereignty and to international cooperation and stability.144  
The extraterritorial application of domestic law also tends to make 
enforcement of human rights dependent on private litigation.145 On its 
face, private litigation has certain benefits because it affords potential 
plaintiffs an opportunity to pursue a remedy for their harms. However, as 
mentioned above, many plaintiffs do not have the significant financial 
resources necessary to pursue remedies through private litigation. Fur-
ther, even if private litigants have the resources to successfully pursue 
litigation against a corporation, there is no guarantee that those plaintiffs 
would have the financial resources to enforce the judgment. After all, 
large transnational corporations have comparatively infinite time and 
resources with which to oppose litigation and the enforcement of judg-
ments. 
In addition, “[e]xtraterritorial laws undermine international 
law . . . .”146 Domestic litigation can divert energy toward short-fixes 
with limited scope that could be better concentrated on working toward 
comprehensive laws and enforcement with long-term effects.147 For ex-
ample, when decisions are not recognized and enforced abroad, battles 
won in one domestic court must then be re-litigated over and over again 
in all of the jurisdictions around the world to achieve truly international 
protections and remedies. 
The state-centered human rights regime is characterized by an em-
phasis on domestic jurisdiction.148 Thus, laws governing the protection 
and enforcement of human rights are at the whim of the prevailing politi-
cal will or lack thereof in any given country at any given time. Arguably, 
it might be possible to fill gaps in the human rights protections and en-
forcement of one country with the extraterritorial application of the do-
mestic laws of another country. However, as this Part I demonstrated, 
such extraterritorial application of domestic law is problematic and can 
undermine the international human rights law regime.149 
This Part I highlighted the weaknesses of the state-centered interna-
tional human rights regime and its inability to respond to the realities of 
  
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. at 862–63.  
 146. Id. at 865. However, this is not to suggest that the territorial jurisdiction of a state is holy 
and should be protected from any and all encroachments. See BLUMBERG, supra note 136, at 201 
(“[T]he extraterritorial assertion of national law inherent in the application of enterprise principles to 
components of multinational groups inevitably will engender international confrontation and disrupt 
international trade and relations.”); Domingo, supra note 47, at 1575–76 (arguing that universal 
harms should be resolved in a universal way). 
 147. See Parrish, supra note 139, at 865–66.  
 148. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7. 
 149. See Parrish, supra note 139, at 865–66.  
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modern transnational corporations.150 State resistance, impotency, and 
complicity lead to under-protection of human rights.151 Extraterritorial 
application of domestic laws is insufficient to fill these gaps and can 
have far-reaching detrimental effects.152 Although the weaknesses of the 
existing regime are well-known and well-documented, the question of 
how to comprehensively address these issues remains unanswered.  
This Article argues that this question is unanswered largely because 
the conflation of human rights law and international human rights law 
has inhibited the evolution of human rights law in other directions. The 
development of new forms of human rights law could address the under-
protection of human rights that results from an over-reliance on interna-
tional human rights law. One issue that new forms of human rights law 
could address is corporate-related human rights abuse. Part II argues that 
human rights law should be extended directly to transnational corpora-
tions because the intersection of human rights and transnational corpo-
rate activity is special and, therefore, requires a specialized regulatory 
regime.  
II. TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS NEED DEDICATED REGULATION 
Alternative forms of human rights law are needed because interna-
tional human rights law is inadequate to enact and enforce comprehen-
sive protections from corporate-related human rights abuses. The inter-
section of transnational corporations and human rights presents particular 
challenges which existing legal regimes are ill-equipped to regulate. One 
reason for this is the combination of the nature of transnational opera-
tions and the importance of human rights. Many transnational corpora-
tions have achieved a level of wealth and influence that strain the regula-
tory competence of nation-states.153 Transnational corporations operate 
and cause or contribute to harms in multiple jurisdictions, which chal-
lenges the effectiveness of traditional territorial jurisdiction. Finally, hu-
man rights represent a special set of societal values that require a level of 
regulation that may exceed those deemed sufficient in other areas of the 
law. This Part II analyzes each of these characteristics of corporate-
related effects on human rights in turn.  
  
 150. See Erika R. George, The Place of the Private Transnational Actor in International Law: 
Human Rights Norms, Development Aims, and Understanding Corporate Self-Regulation as Soft 
Law, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 473, 474 (2007). 
 151. See Peerenboom, supra note 109, at 943–44. 
 152. See Parrish, supra note 139, at 866.  
 153. See generally JOEL BALKAN, THE CORPORATION: THE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF 
PROFIT AND POWER 3 (2004) (examining the strength and wealth of transnational corporations). 
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A. Wealth and Influence of Transnational Corporations 
Transnational corporations have achieved vast wealth and immense 
influence.154 They exercise economic, political, and legal influence in 
home countries, the country of incorporation, and host countries—the 
country in which assets or operations are located.155 This exercise of in-
fluence inhibits the ability of states to prevent and redress corporate-
related human rights abuses.156 
1. Economic Might of Transnational Corporations 
Foreign direct investment, which takes the form of owning, operat-
ing, or managing a business in host countries, is an important component 
of transnational corporations’ operations.157 States allow foreign direct 
investment by transnational corporations within their borders for a vari-
ety of reasons. Two of the main reasons that host countries allow—and 
more importantly encourage—foreign direct investment are to gain infu-
sions of capital and know-how in the short term and to achieve economic 
prosperity in the long term.158 
In 2007, there were approximately 77,000 transnational corpora-
tions.159 The foreign assets of the top twenty transnational corporations 
amounted to over $2,904,995 million.160 The majority of the largest 
transnational corporations are incorporated in more developed coun-
tries.161 However, at least since the European occupation of Africa and 
other former colonies, transnational corporations have chosen to own, 
operate, and manage business operations in countries in which they are 
not incorporated, and they continue to do so today in increasing num-
bers.162 In some cases, the wealth of a transnational corporation may ex-
  
 154. See generally United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, The Universe of the 
Largest Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIA/2007/2 (2007) [hereinafter 
UNCTAD], available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiia20072_en.pdf (compiling a list of the 
100 largest non-financial transnational corporations and the top fifty transnational corporations from 
developing countries).  
 155. Jernej Letnar Cernic, Corporate Human Rights Obligations under Stabilization Clauses, 
11 GER. L.J. 210, 218 (2010); see also Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 962–63 (2010) (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the ability of corporations to exert 
political influence through political speech and election contributions). 
 156. Cernic, supra note 155, at 211.  
 157. UNCTAD, supra note 154, at 3 (stating that 770,000 foreign affiliates of transnational 
corporations have globally generated an estimated $4.5 trillion in value since the early 1990’s).  
 158. Padma Mallampally & Karl P. Sauvant, Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Coun-
tries, FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, Mar. 1999, at 34–36, available at http://www.imf.org/external/ 
pubs/ft/fandd/1999/03/pdf/mallampa.pdf. 
 159. UNCTAD, supra note138, at 3. 
 160. Id. at 40. 
 161. Id. at 4. The European Union, Japan, and the United States are the home countries for 
eighty-five percent of the top one hundred transnational corporations. Id. The number of transna-
tional corporations incorporated in less developed economies is growing but only a handful have 
entered the ranks of the world’s largest. Id. at 15–16. 
 162. See Cernic, supra note 155, at 211. 
File: Anderson_FinalProof_12711.doc Created on: 1/27/11 6:12 PM Last Printed: 1/28/11 7:16 AM 
2010] REIMAGINING HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 205 
 
ceed the wealth of the host country itself.163 The wealth of transnational 
corporations gives them room to influence the abuse or enjoyment of 
human rights by individuals and communities in both home and host 
countries.164 
2. The Siren Song of Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment by transnational corporations is consid-
ered to be a significant source of private external financing for develop-
ing countries.165 In 2008, approximately forty-three percent of all inward 
foreign direct investment flowed into transitional and developing coun-
tries.166 Foreign direct investment is also important to developing coun-
tries as an opportunity for innovation, technology transfer, human capac-
ity development, and access to various forms of corporate governance.167 
The need (real or perceived) for foreign capital makes many host coun-
tries dependent on it for development and, therefore, susceptible to the 
influence of transnational corporations.168  
In addition to potential economic benefits, foreign direct investment 
by transnational corporations also exerts socio-cultural, political, and 
legal influence in host countries.169 In some countries, transnational cor-
porations may reinforce gender hierarchies by paying, or allowing their 
subsidiaries to pay, women less than men for the same work.170 The ef-
fects of foreign direct investment may also be indirect and unexpected. 
Between 1989 and 1992 in Papua New Guinea, for example, increased 
income resulting from foreign direct investment was linked to increased 
  
 163. Halpern, supra note 30, at 144 (“[T]he process of economic globalization has allowed 
many TNCs to accumulate vast sums of resources and power, often times in excess of the host 
state’s own.”); see also Baker, supra note 139, at 94. 
 164. JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 1–2. 
 165. Mallampally & Sauvant, supra note 158, at 35; see also, United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development, World Investment Directory: Volume X Africa 2008, at 1, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2007/5 (2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteiit20075_en.pdf 
(“The ratio of FDI inflows to the region’s gross fixed capital formation . . . [was] 20 per cent in 
2006.”). 
 166. See Inward & Outward Foreign Direct Investment Flows, UNCTADSTAT, 
http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx?ReportId=88 (last visited Oct. 29, 2010) 
(calculated using 2008 data available on UNCTADSTAT). 
 167. Mallampally & Sauvant, supra note 158, at 35–36. 
 168. See id. at 36. 
 169. Baker, supra note 139, at 89 (“[Transnational corporations are] potentially more economi-
cally powerful than Stalin’s Soviet Union, and with more broad-based political influence than The 
Third Reich.”).  
 170. See U.N. Secretary-General, The World’s Women 2005: Progress in Statistics, 54, U.N. 
Doc. ST/ESA/STAT/SER.K/17 (2006), available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products 
/indwm/ww2005_pub/English/WW2005_text_complete_BW.pdf. For a discussion of the gendered 
effects of foreign direct investment, see generally Rachel J. Anderson, Foreign Direct Investment 
and Distributional Equity for Women, 31 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. (forthcoming 2010). See also 
Darren Rosenblum, Feminizing Capital: A Corporate Imperative, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 55, 74–80 
(2009) for a more comprehensive discussion of women’s work and DOUGLAS BRANSON, NO SEAT 
AT THE TABLE: HOW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LAW KEEP WOMEN OUT OF THE BOARDROOM 
(2006) for a discussion of implicit male bias in corporate governance and the effects of this bias on 
women’s rights. 
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consumption, which was linked to increased rates of polygamy.171 Men 
with more income were able to take more wives.172 
3. Political Influence of Transnational Corporations 
Transnational corporations exert political influence in both home 
and host countries. This influence may be direct or indirect or both. In 
home countries, for example, transnational corporations exert political 
influence through lobbying and campaign contributions.173 When a 
transnational corporation exerts political influence, it affects government 
decision making in a way that encourages government action or inac-
tion.174  
Transnational corporations may also use their political influence in 
their home country to influence decisions in host countries. For example, 
transnational corporations incorporated in countries like the United 
States pressure their home governments to pressure governments in de-
veloping countries to provide protections for the corporations’ intellec-
tual property.175  
4. Legal Influence of Transnational Corporations 
Transnational corporations are often able to influence the applica-
tion and enforcement of laws in the countries in which they operate. For 
example, Nike’s Korean suppliers operating shoe factories in Indonesia 
in the early 1990s successfully petitioned for and received an exemption 
from the minimum wage.176 The companies claimed that paying mini-
  
 171. See Glenn Banks, Globalization, Poverty, and Hyperdevelopment in Papua New Guinea’s 
Mining Sector, 46 FOCCAL–EUR. J. ANTHROPOLOGY 128, 135 (2005). 
 172. See id. 
 173. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 881–86 (2010). This recent U.S. Supreme 
Court case ensured the ability of corporations, whether domestic and foreign, to exert political influ-
ence through political speech and election contributions. Id.; cf. 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1) (2006) (pro-
hibiting foreign nationals from directly or indirectly making contributions or independent expendi-
tures in connection with a U.S. election). However, the majority opinion does not address whether 
the “[g]overnment has a compelling interest in preventing foreign individuals or associations from 
influencing” the domestic political process. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 911. Further, the majority 
does not consider the issues in this case in the context of transnational corporations. Id. at 936 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 174. Id. at 961–63. 
 175. See Peter Straub, Farmers in the IP Wrench—How Patents on Gene-Modified Crops 
Violate the Right to Food in Developing Countries, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 187, 193 
(2006). For example, U.S. companies have tried to “‘invent restrictions that do not exist within 
international law and compel developing countries to accept them through U.S. trade pressures.’” 
Special 301 Review Public Hearing: Hearing Before the Special 301 Subcommittee of the Office of 
the U.S. Trade Representative, at 104 (2010) (from testimony given by a representative from Doc-
tors Without Borders) available at http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/1726.&nbsp. Strong intellec-
tual property rights can have detrimental effects on human health and life. Id. at 97–98 (“People in 
developing countries are dying because medicines do not exist due to inadequate incentives for their 
development or because they're unavailable due in part to patent barriers and high costs.”). For a 
more comprehensive discussion of the intersection of trade and human rights, see BERTA 
HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & STEPHEN J. POWELL, JUST TRADE: A NEW COVENANT LINKING TRADE 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2009). 
 176. Locke, supra note 22, at 10.  
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mum wage would be a hardship for them.177 The local minimum wage at 
the time was approximately $1 per day (2,100 rupiah) and covered only 
70% of the basic needs of one individual.178 This arrangement allowed 
factories producing Nike products to underpay more than 25,000 workers 
without violating the letter of the law in Indonesia—the host country.179 
This practice was discontinued on Nike’s request in the mid 1990s—an 
example of transnational corporations’ ability to prevent human rights 
abuses by their subsidiaries and suppliers, if they choose to do so.180 
One important way that transnational corporations affect the legal 
regimes in host countries is through investment agreements between the 
state and one or more investors. Investor-state investment agreements are 
agreements between host states and investors to set rules, standards, and 
even determine the laws that will apply to the transaction that is the ob-
ject of the contract.181 Investor-state investment agreements are problem-
atic for the protection of human rights because they insulate “projects 
from standards of protection of basic rights that apply elsewhere in a host 
country; and [they] shrink[] certain remedies that victims would other-
wise have.”182 Investment agreements between states and transnational 
corporations are common, for example, in the extraction sector.183  
Investor-state investment agreements highlight a key problem asso-
ciated with transaction-based law and policymaking that takes place out-
side of a comprehensive legal and regulatory framework. This is signaled 
by the fact that investor-state investment agreements are commonly re-
ferred to as international investment agreements.184 This nomenclature 
supports claims that some transnational corporations have amassed pre-
viously unknown influence over the law and policymaking power of 
these agreements. In the international investment agreement, transna-
tional corporations become quasi-states that enter into agreements with 
nation-states, and they imbue the transnational corporations with rights 
and powers that allow them to encroach upon prerogatives of the public 
  
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. 
 180. Id. at 11. Nike first denied the ability to affect the practices of companies in its supply 
chain and then only did so after substantial bad press. Id. at 10–11. 
 181. See Sheldon Leader, Human Rights, Risks, and New Strategies for Global Investment, 9 J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 657, 703–04 (2006) (discussing the types of clauses in investment contracts and 
international investment contracts in conjunction with human rights); see also Wendy N. Duong, 
Partnerships with Monarchs—Two Case Studies: Case One, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 1171, 1265 
(2004) (“In various forms, the [Stabilization] Clause restricts the host jurisdiction’s exercise of 
‘permanent sovereignty’ by contractually preventing the nation-state from subsequently modifying 
the governing law of the investment contract.”). Concession agreements between early transnational 
corporations, formerly colonial trading companies, are the predecessors of modern international 
investment contracts. See ANGHIE, supra note 52, at 233–34.  
 182. Leader, supra note 181, at 700. 
 183. See id. at 661, 696 (discussing the BTC pipeline connecting the Caspian and Mediterra-
nean Seas and the Chad-Cameroon pipeline agreement). 
 184. This is a post-World War II development in international law. ANGHIE, supra note 52, at 
230. 
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domain.185 Taking this one step further, international investment agree-
ments even have the potential to trump both domestic and international 
law.186  
These investor-state agreements are, thus, not subject to domestic 
law but rather a legal system of a different kind.187 Generally, these 
agreements are considered to be subject to “an international law sys-
tem.”188 Thus, although the agreement is not between two nations, it is 
treated as inter-national if one of the parties is a developing country and 
one of the parties is a transnational corporation, but not if the country 
involved is a “developed” country.189 As international agreements, arbi-
tration of disputes is subject to international rather than national law.190 
However, the shifting of transnational corporations into a quasi-
state status glosses over important distinctions. Transnational corpora-
tions are not states and, although the line between public and private is a 
topic for debate, according them a quasi-state status contributes to the 
obfuscation of problematic trends related to transaction-based law and 
policy making. Transaction-based law and policy making is not subjected 
to the scrutiny accorded a more public deliberative process, and the im-
mediate interests of the parties are narrower than would be the case, for 
example, if third parties with differing interests were directly involved. 
States are at a greater disadvantage when entering into investment 
agreements than may be apparent at first blush. Initially, it might seem 
that the state has all the power since it is a sovereign nation and is the 
maker and enforcer of law and policy within its territories. However, the 
reason that states enter into investment agreements with investors is that 
they do not have the domestic capacity, whether public or private, to 
achieve the purpose of the agreement.191 Thus, they need to attract one or 
more foreign investors, although they may not necessarily need to attract 
a specific foreign investor. Depending on the industry, the number of 
potential foreign investors may be extremely limited due to high barriers 
to entry. For example, only a limited number of corporations have 
equipment readily available to dedicate to drilling oil, and corporations 
that want to enter this market must have sufficient capital to lay out in 
  
 185. See ANGHIE, supra note 52, at 232. 
 186. See Cernic, supra note 155, at 218 (analyzing the language of the 2005 Mineral Develop-
ment Agreement between the National Transitional Government of Liberia and Mittal Steel Hold-
ings AG). 
 187. See ANGHIE, supra note 52, at 231. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See ANGHIE, supra note 52, at 231–32 (quoting Derek Bowett, State Contracts with Ali-
ens: Contemporary Developments on Compensation for Termination or Breach, 59 BRITISH Y.B. 
INT’L L. 49, 51 (1988)).  
 190. Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R 389, 433 (Arb. Trib. 
1977). 
 191. See generally Leader, supra note 181, at 657–694 (discussing investment contracts). 
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advance to purchase the expensive equipment necessary for oil drill-
ing.192 
Investment agreements between transnational corporations and host 
countries create special legal regimes of limited duration with potentially 
substantial effects.193 These special legal regimes can weaken legal pro-
tections for individuals and communities in host countries.194 For exam-
ple, existing human rights standards may be affected indirectly or are 
limited directly by the terms of the international investment contract.195 
When this happens, the host state may effectively lose its ability to en-
force otherwise applicable human rights laws and standards.196 
Most investor-state investment agreements include stabilization 
clauses.197 A stabilization clause is “contract language which freezes the 
provisions of a national system of law chosen as the law of the contract 
as of the date of the contract, in order to prevent the application to the 
contract of any future alterations of this system.”198 The purpose of stabi-
lization clauses is to protect transnational corporations from unfavorable 
and perhaps unfair changes in legislation or regulations after they are 
locked into the contract and have sunk money into the project.199 These 
stabilization clauses can, for example, prevent host states from applying 
laws that come into existence after the contract is signed to the transac-
tion that is the object of the contract.200  
On their face, stabilization clauses make sense because they miti-
gate the risk to a transnational corporation that the other party to the con-
tract, a sovereign state with law-making power, might change the laws 
for its own benefit at any time. However, a broad stabilization clause 
may also have the effect of depriving individuals and communities in the 
host country of human rights protections that may become enforceable 
by law after the date of an investment contract. In fact, stabilization 
  
 192. See id. at 682–83. 
 193. See id. at 660. Although the duration is limited, it still extends for the life of the invest-
ment project, which is often as long as seventy years. Id.  
 194. Id. 
 195. See, e.g., Cernic, supra note 155, at 220–21 (discussing the stabilization clause in the Host 
Government Agreements between a consortium of oil corporations and the governments of Azerbai-
jan, Georgia, and Turkey regarding the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project). 
 196. Leader, supra note 181, at 671. 
 197. Cernic, supra note 155, at 213. There are various forms of stabilization clauses. Id. at 214. 
See J. Nna Emeka, Anchoring Stabilization Clauses in International Petroleum Contracts, 42 INT’L 
LAW. 1317, 1318–20 (2008) (discussing the rationale for and the origin of stabilization clauses); see 
also Christopher T. Curtis, The Legal Security of Economic Development Agreements, 29 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 317, 321 (1988) (describing both stabilization and governing-law clauses in an investment 
agreement). 
 198. Cernic, supra note 155, at 213; see also Curtis, supra note 197, at 346–47 (discussing the 
nature of stabilization clauses); Sang-Jick Yoon, Comment, Critical Issues on the Foreign Invest-
ment Laws of North Korea for Foreign Investors, 15 WIS. INT’L L.J. 325, 364–65 (1997) (describing 
how stabilization clauses are “grandfathered exceptions to the new law”). 
 199. See Cernic, supra note 155, at 213–14. 
 200. See Leader, supra note 181, at 672–681 (discussing stabilization clauses in international 
investment contracts). 
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clauses are sometimes structured so that the entry into an international 
agreement to protect human rights by a host state can make the host state 
liable to the transnational corporation for profit lost due to the need to 
comply with laws protecting human rights.201 
B. Complexities of Multijurisdictional Regulation and Enforcement 
The complex structure of transnational operations often triggers 
questions of jurisdiction and impedes transnational enforcement.202 It 
also creates a need for the development of comprehensive global regula-
tion. Although there are jurisdictional challenges, there are also options 
that offer promising alternatives to address existing jurisdictional hur-
dles. 
1. Territorial Jurisdiction 
Territorial jurisdiction, also known as national jurisdiction, state ju-
risdiction, domestic jurisdiction, and sovereignty, is the power a state has 
to make laws that govern its territories and the power of its courts to ex-
ercise jurisdiction within the bounds of its territories.203 Territorial juris-
diction is one of the oldest, most fundamental, and accepted forms of 
jurisdiction.204 Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, which prohibits states from 
interfering in the territorial jurisdiction of other states, further protects 
the territorial jurisdiction of states.205  
Territorial jurisdiction makes it possible, at least theoretically, to 
enact and enforce laws governing transnational corporations in the juris-
dictions in which they are incorporated, operate, or have assets.206 In 
part, this is because respect for state sovereignty remains a central tenet 
of international human rights law.207 Thus, domestic tax, labor, business, 
and antitrust laws, etc., primarily govern transnational corporations. This 
is not to suggest that these laws do not sometimes have extraterritorial 
  
 201. See Leader, supra note 181, at 673–75. 
 202. Jurisdiction is the power to regulate and to enforce. See generally GARY B. BORN, 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2009); Gary B. Born, Reflections on Judicial Juris-
diction in International Cases, 17 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 7–25 (1987) (discussing judicial 
jurisdiction in the international context). 
 203. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Defining the Limits: Universal Jurisdiction and National Courts, 
in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 168, 171–72 (Stephen Macedo, ed., 2004); see also M. Cherif Bas-
siouni, The History of Universal Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 39, 40 (Stephen Macedo 
ed., 2004); cf. Blakesley & Stigall, supra note 138, at 12 (discussing two types of jurisdiction: “rule-
making and rule-enforcing jurisdiction,” which take three forms: “prescriptive or legislative, adjudi-
cative, and enforcement”). 
 204. See Bassiouni, supra note 203, at 40.  
 205. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 206. See JESSUP, supra note 32, at 74–76 (discussing territorial jurisdiction governing transna-
tional corporations and the past resentments between the judicial authorities of the United States and 
Canadian companies).  
 207. See Parrish, supra note 139, at 824 (discussing one reason for this central tenant-fears of 
some scholars, theorists, and policy makers that international law has more democratic legitimacy 
than domestic law). See also MALANCZUK, supra note 47, at 17–18 and Domingo, supra note 47, at 
1556–65 for a discussion of the theory, doctrine, and concepts of sovereignty.  
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reach, but rather that—in most cases—they are dependent on domestic 
enforcement.208 However, in practice, territorial jurisdiction has proven 
to be a limited tool. Transnational corporations often operate in the con-
text of a multinational enterprise, which includes multiple entities incor-
porated in multiple jurisdictions working with various partners and sup-
pliers.209 
In the case of lawmaking to protect human rights, territorial juris-
diction generally determines which state and law-making bodies have 
prescriptive jurisdiction, also known as legislative jurisdiction.210 In addi-
tion, as discussed above, prescriptive jurisdiction may determine the ap-
plication of international law and extraterritorial application of domestic 
law. For example, bilateral investment treaties are forms of international 
lawmaking that govern foreign direct investment.211 However, domestic 
and international laws, when they exist, are often fragmented and not 
enforced. Recall the minimum wage exceptions granted by the Indone-
sian government to Nike suppliers.212 
When corporate-related human rights abuses occur in the context of 
a multinational operation, multiple states may have the right to exercise 
jurisdiction. Domestic conflict of laws rules can be used to determine 
which of the states that have the right to exercise jurisdiction should ex-
ercise that right in a particular case.213 Although this may seem to offer 
plaintiffs multiple jurisdictions and thus multiple opportunities to pursue 
redress for their claims, in practice this can work to the disadvantage of 
potential plaintiffs. For example, the courts in the home country of a de-
fendant transnational corporation may—based on their own national con-
flict of law rules—decide not to assert jurisdiction under the principle of 
forum non conveniens. In dismissing a case for forum non conveniens, 
the court finds that another forum, the host country for example, would 
be a better suited—more convenient—alternative forum. At the same 
time, the plaintiffs claims may be blocked for political or other reasons in 
the host country. Therefore, if such a claim is dismissed, the effect in 
practice is often that potential plaintiffs are left without a forum in which 
to bring their claims. This is particularly true for claims dismissed in the 
United States since it is one of the primary—and only—forums in which 
  
 208. See Parrish, supra note 139, at 820, 846 for a discussion of the rise of extraterritorial 
domestic law and associated problems. 
 209. See Anderson, supra note 34, at 2. 
 210. See Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Human Rights 
Litigation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 271, 271–72 (2009) (discussing the international law implications 
for foreign investors responsible for human rights abuses in developing nations in which they do 
business). 
 211. See generally Leader, supra note 165, at 660–70. 
 212. Locke, supra note 22, at 10–11. 
 213. See JESSUP, supra note 32, at 35–39 (discussing the difference between international law 
and conflicts of law and which one holds the power in a particular problem).  
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is possible to bring claims for corporate-related human rights viola-
tions.214  
2. Other Forms of State Jurisdiction 
In addition to territorial jurisdiction, there are numerous other types 
of jurisdiction in the transnational context. The least controversial form 
of jurisdiction is where there is a tie between the prescribing or enforcing 
state and the party who is the object of this prescription or enforcement. 
The traditional bases of prescriptive jurisdiction, the power to make rules 
and regulations, are territory and citizenship.215 As discussed above, 
countries commonly make laws that govern their citizens and people 
within their territory.216 These are also generally accepted as a matter of 
customary international law.217  
Forms of judicial jurisdiction, the power of a court to exercise juris-
diction, include personal jurisdiction and jurisdiction based on effects, 
consent, nationality, and property.218 However, the recognized forms of 
judicial jurisdiction are not uniform and vary from country to country. 
For example, the United States recognizes tag or transient jurisdiction, 
whereby the courts may assert personal jurisdiction even if the defendant 
is passing through their jurisdiction on a wholly unrelated matter.219 
French courts will generally grant jurisdiction in any case that involves a 
French national on either side.220 German courts grant jurisdiction in 
cases involving property located in Germany whether or not the owners 
have any other ties or connections to Germany.221 
3. Universal Jurisdiction 
In addition to the various forms of jurisdiction recognized by differ-
ent countries, there is also jurisdiction that stems from the nature of the 
conduct. Universal jurisdiction allows courts to exercise jurisdiction 
based on the type of conduct alone without any other connection to the 
state that is exercising jurisdiction.222 Often, people think only about 
  
 214. See Anderson, supra note 34, at 4–5.  
 215. Paul B. Stephan, Symmetry and Selectivity: What Happens in International Law When the 
World Changes, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 91, 105 (2009). 
 216. See Ramsey, supra note 210, at 284. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Born, supra note 202, at 1–3, 14–20. 
 219. Id. at 12, 36 n.147. 
 220. See Born, supra note 202, at 14 (citing CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art 14–15 (Fr.)). 
 221. See Born, supra note 202, at 14–15 (citing ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE] Sept. 12, 1950, § 23 (Ger.); Christof von Dryander, Jurisdiction in Civil and 
Commercial Matters Under the German Code of Civil Procedure, 16 INT’L LAW. 671, 678 (1982)). 
 222. Peter Weiss, Universal Jurisdiction: Past, Present and Future, 102 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
PROC. 406, 407 (2008) (citing PRINCETON PROJECT ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION, THE PRINCETON 
PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 28 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2001) [hereinafter PRINCETON 
PRINCIPLES] (“[U]niversal jurisdiction is criminal jurisdiction based solely on the nature of the 
crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the alleged or convicted 
perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the state exercising such juris-
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criminal universal jurisdiction when they think about universal jurisdic-
tion.  
Criminal universal jurisdiction applies to conduct that falls within 
one of the following categories: “piracy, slavery, genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, torture, and ‘perhaps certain acts of terror-
ism.’”223 Although much of the discussion about universal jurisdiction 
focuses on criminal cases, universal jurisdiction can also apply in civil 
contexts.224 Despite a lack of consensus as to whether human rights are 
universal, it may be possible to reach a consensus that human rights 
should be protected from private actors. However, universal civil juris-
diction for corporate-related human rights abuses is not yet an estab-
lished principle of law. 
C. Human Rights and Core Values in Crisis 
Alone, the power and influence of transnational corporations may 
not be sufficient to justify developing alternative regulatory and en-
forcement options. Even coupled with the challenges of multijurisdic-
tional regulation and enforcement, it may be difficult to convince many 
scholars and policy makers that additional administrative and regulatory 
mechanisms are necessary to restrain and harness the power and influ-
ence of transnational corporations. However, the nature of human rights 
as core values and the history of corporate-related human rights abuses 
lend support to arguments for the need to regulate transnational corpora-
tions at a global level.225 
In western cultures, the idea of human rights as an individual’s 
claim that can be asserted against society (whether or not there is a legal 
right) has its roots in the medieval era.226 The western origins of civil and 
political rights as protections against government have their roots in the 
Renaissance and the Reformation.227 However, protection of human 
  
diction.”)). Universal jurisdiction is one of the most controversial forms of jurisdiction. See Henry J. 
Steiner, Three Cheers for Universal Jurisdiction—or Is It Only Two?, 5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
199, 224–26 (2004) (describing reaction from other states to the potential exercise of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction by Belgian courts). 
 223. Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’L L. 149, 
151 (2006) (citing United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1091 (D.C. Cir. 1991)); see also 
PRINCETON PRINCIPLES, supra note 222, at 29; Anthony J. Colangelo, The New Universal Jurisdic-
tion: In Absentia Signaling Over Clearly Defined Crimes, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 537, 578–603 (2005).  
 224. See Weiss, supra note 222, at 407.  
 225. See Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization: The Com-
ing Conflict, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 211, 304 (2005) (“From a compliance point of view, what is most 
distinctive about human rights law is that it requires extraordinarily high compliance levels.”). 
 226. Rubin, supra note 14, at 10 (discussing the origins of the doctrine of natural rights). For a 
justification for a rights approach, see Barbara Stark, Women’s Rights, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 341–44 (David P. Forsythe, ed., 2009) (arguing that the benefits of a rights approach include 
the moral weight carried by rights rhetoric, the provision of a theoretical framework, a well-
established infrastructure, and the power and flexibility of rights as a tool). 
 227. Id. at 35–37 (discussing the origins of civil and political rights). 
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rights through law emerged out of religious and public policy considera-
tions.228 
Historically, rules and laws protecting human dignity and human 
rights were often articulated in response to extreme power and influence 
combined with encroachments upon those rights and dignity. Crisis is 
often the catalyst that prompts change. There are many examples of these 
times of crisis and change, including in the history of the Catholic 
Church, the American Revolution, and the post-World War II creation of 
the international human rights regime.229 
Religious institutions have espoused human rights—albeit under 
another name—as core values for centuries. The predecessor of early 
western human rights theory, natural rights theory, emerged at a time 
when the Catholic Church exercised enormous power.230 This time of 
crisis is exemplified by the tension between the growth of the Franciscan 
Order after its recognition by Pope Innocent III in 1209 and the Inquisi-
tion’s increasing violence, including torture.231 Under the doctrine of 
natural rights, there are certain “claims that can be asserted by all human 
beings.”232 These ideas are captured in the writings of William von Ock-
ham, author of the first Western theory of natural rights and a follower of 
the Franciscan philosophies.233 They have also been delineated in the 
Catholic social doctrine.234 
Human rights have been articulated as core values as part of the 
creation of nations. In the eighteenth century, the American Declaration 
of Independence, one of the most famous articulations of individual 
rights as a political idea, was signed in the context of economic oppres-
sion by the British government of its American colonies.235 This crisis is 
exemplified by oppression in the form of, for example, the Sugar, Stamp, 
and Townshend Acts. These acts imposed taxes and import restrictions 
  
 228. Id. at 168. 
 229. See generally THOMAS D. WILLIAMS, WHO IS MY NEIGHBOR?: PERSONALISM AND THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 31–52 (2005), for a historical perspective of the Church’s atti-
tudes concerning human rights. 
 230. See Rubin, supra note 14, at 10. 
 231. See id. at 12; Inquisition, CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/ 
08026a.htm#IIA (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). 
 232. Rubin, supra note 14, at 10. 
 233. Id. at 13–14; see id. at 14–17 (discussing Ockham’s writings). 
 234. See generally JAY P. CORRIN, CATHOLIC INTELLECTUALS AND THE CHALLENGE OF 
DEMOCRACY 41–81 (2002) (describing the development of Catholic social action and the principles 
of Rerum Novarum (On Capital and Labor)); RICHARD W. ROUSSEAU, HUMAN DIGNITY AND THE 
COMMON GOOD: THE GREAT PAPAL SOCIAL ENCYCLICALS FROM LEO XIII TO JOHN PAUL II (2002) 
(describing the eight major papal encyclicals on the Church’s social teaching); JOHAN D. VAN DER 
VYVER, LEUVEN LECTURES ON RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS, RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES AND RIGHTS 
91–116 (2004) (discussing economic and social human rights and Pope Leo XIII and the Rerum 
Novarum, the “Magna Carta of Catholic social teaching”). See generally MODERN CATHOLIC 
SOCIAL TEACHING 72–174 (Kenneth R. Himes ed., 2005) for an extensive discussion of the eco-
nomic, legal, political, cultural, and social context leading to the creation of the Catholic social 
doctrine.  
 235. See HENKIN, supra note 49, at 1. 
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upon colonists who did not have a voice in the government and were 
backed by the threat of and acts of violence. The Declaration of Inde-
pendence posits that all human beings, or at least all men, possess “cer-
tain unalienable Rights,” including “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Hap-
piness.”236  
The international community has championed human rights as core 
values. Modern international human rights documents delineating the 
rights of individuals and communities against abuses of state power 
flourished in the wake of the Nazi-driven horrors of the last century.237 
This time of crisis is exemplified by the genocide committed by the 
German National Socialist government against Jewish, black, Sinti and 
Roma, and other peoples as well as political dissidents. The 1948 Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights was signed in the wake of these 
atrocities.238  
Private economic actors and international organizations have en-
dorsed human rights as core values. The crisis of corporate-related hu-
man rights abuses has been detailed above and there is increasingly 
broad recognition that transnational corporations should be subject to 
human rights law.239 Many corporations are reconsidering their role in 
respecting human rights.240 Voluntary codes of conduct have prolifer-
ated.241 At the international level, the U.N. Global Compact promotes 
core human rights and other principles in the context of global business 
activities.242 However, to effectively regulate transnational corporations, 
regulations and regulatory control must be comprehensive and enforce-
able.243 Part III looks towards the development of a comprehensive 
global legal framework for regulating transnational corporations. 
  
 236. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
 237. HENKIN, supra note 49, at 1; see MALANCZUK, supra note 47, at 209. However, some 
scholars argue that the Nazi’s human rights abuses are less central to the development of the interna-
tional human rights regime than is often ascribed to them. See Mazower, supra note 51, at 381 (“As 
for Nazi evil, we know now that the Holocaust as such was much less central to perceptions of what 
the war had been about in 1945 than it is today.”). 
 238. HENKIN, supra note 49, at 1. 
 239. See Deva, supra note 2, at 1 (“The international community is realizing that in order to 
achieve fuller and wider realization of human rights, the umbrella of human rights obligations and 
their enforcement should cover MNCs.”); see also Ratner, supra note 82, at 446–47 (providing 
examples of human rights violations in different regions and the response toward transnational 
corporations operating there). 
 240. See George, supra note 150, at 474–75. 
 241. George, supra note 150, at 475; Ratner, supra note 82, at 448. See generally Lisa M. 
Fairfax, Easier Said than Done? A Corporate Law Theory for Actualizing Social Responsibility 
Rhetoric, 59 FLA. L. REV. 771, 771–826 (2007), for a discussion of the behavioral significance of 
corporate rhetoric. 
 242. See JOSEPH, supra note 1, at 7–8; Anderson, supra note 34, at 17; George, supra note 150, 
at 475. 
 243. BLUMBERG, supra note 136, at 200–01 (“The reality of the matter is that effective regula-
tion of corporate groups or their activities inevitably requires control of all the components partici-
pating in the enterprise. . . . [I]t is essential that the legal structure match the economic structure of 
the enterprise subject to the regulatory system.”); see also Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the 
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III. GLOBAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 
This Part III sets out a proposal for the global regulation of transna-
tional corporations. This proposal has three parts that address existing 
institutional, legislative, and enforcement weaknesses in current regula-
tion of transnational corporations. Specifically, it proposes the creation 
of a global institution, development of uniform model laws, and imple-
mentation of universal enforcement mechanisms for corporate-related 
human rights abuses. 
A global regulatory scheme has the potential to be more successful 
than a political one. In recent years, regulatory cooperation has success-
fully developed international rules.244 In part, this is explained by eco-
nomic assumptions that regulations are needed in the case of market fail-
ure; for example, when sovereign national governments cannot regulate 
global actors or where market failures are combined with government 
failures.245 As discussed in Parts I and II, in the context of corporate-
related human rights abuses, regulation by national governments is in-
adequate for a number of reasons—including the power and influence of 
transnational corporations.  
To be successful, a regulatory system for transnational corporations 
should meet several criteria. Regulation should be truly global so that 
transnational corporations cannot avoid responsibility and accountability 
by jurisdiction hopping or forum shopping. Global regulations and laws 
also have the potential to reduce the incentives for states to allow stan-
dards that are so low that they encourage human rights abuses in order to 
encourage foreign direct investment. If laws and regulations are global 
and set a globally adhered to minimum standard, this would not eliminate 
competition between states but it could increase the enactment and en-
forcement of human rights laws.  
Global regulation should include rulemaking, adjudicatory, and en-
forcement components.246 Rulemaking would define appropriate conduct 
for transnational corporations and protections for potential victims of 
corporate-related human rights abuses. Providing for global adjudication 
options would increase access for potential plaintiffs to bring a claim for 
  
Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 83 (2001) (“The 
recognition of human rights may be won by the activism of social movements, but this victory must 
be secured by the development of legal concepts that can be understood and used by public decision 
makers.”); Aneel Karani, The Case Against Corporate Social Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Aug. 23, 
2010 (arguing that voluntary measures fail when they conflict with financial goals). 
 244. David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International 
Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 281, 282 (1998). 
 245. John-ren Chen, Global Market, National Sovereignty and International Institutions, in 
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN GLOBALISATION: THE CHALLENGES OF REFORM 1, 
1 (John-ren Chen ed., 2003). 
 246. See generally David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563, 563–611 (2008), for a discussion of rulemaking, adjudication, and 
the increasing importance administrative institutions at the global level.  
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harms before an adjudicatory body. Global enforcement would create an 
avenue by which successful plaintiffs could obtain remedies anywhere in 
the world. Ideally, a global regulatory system should not only create dis-
incentives for harmful behavior, but should also encourage beneficial 
behavior. Further, it should be informed by other prior and current efforts 
to create global and transnational regulatory bodies and rules.247 It should 
also be compatible with existing structures like the U.N. Framework 
wherever possible.  
Creating a global regulatory framework and component mecha-
nisms will not happen overnight. This is a multi-stage, multi-component 
proposal comprised of short-term, medium-term, and long-term ele-
ments. In the short term, developing a global institution is a matter of the 
first order. As the proposed site for the drafting of uniform model laws, a 
global institution is a pre-requisite for the medium-term element of creat-
ing a body of uniform model legislation. In the medium term, this pro-
posal foresees the drafting of model uniform laws that can be adopted in 
toto or with some variations by the nations of the world.248 In the long 
term, this proposal envisions adjudication of claims in domestic courts or 
the use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms or both and en-
forcement of remedies for successful plaintiffs. 
  
 247. Earlier attempts include the failed UN Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights and the comparatively 
successful OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Sub-
Comm’n on the Promotion and Prot. Of Human Rights, Rep. on its 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (August 26, 2003) [hereinafter U.N. Norms]. See generally Larry Catá 
Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The United Nations’ Norms on the Re-
sponsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of Corporate Social Responsibility in 
International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287, 292–93 (2006) (discussing the U.N. Norms 
as evidence of an increasing trend toward mandatory Corporate Social Responsibility); Surya Deva, 
UN’s Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises: An 
Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?, 10 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 493 (2004) (discussing the 
strengths and weaknesses of the U.N. Norms); David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901–08 (2003) (discussing the background and drafting 
history of the U.N. Norms). Most prior attempts to extend human rights law to transnational corpora-
tions were usually unsuccessful. Other attempts include, for example, the 1983 Draft United Nations 
Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations, the 1958 Abs Shawcross Proposed Convention to 
Protect Foreign Investment, and the 1957 Draft International Convention for the Mutual Protection 
of Private Property Rights, U.N. Comm’n on Transnat’l Corps., Draft U.N. Code of Conduct on 
Transnat’l Corps., E/1983/17/Rev.1 (1983). Arguably, one main reason these attempts failed is that 
they were trying to work within the international system, which suffers from an aggregated lack of 
incentives for states to enforce human rights laws as discussed above. As long as states have a disin-
centive to reform, such attempts face an uphill battle that almost dooms them to failure from the 
start. 
 248. Bernardo M. Cremades & Steven L. Plehn, The New Lex Mercatoria and the Harmoniza-
tion of the Laws of International Commercial Transactions, 2 B.U. INT’L L.J. 317, 323 (1984) (“The 
model law process represents a compromise between the treaty process and purely unilateral action 
by nations.”). However, variations to model laws should not be for the purpose of limiting their 
scope as is often the case with the use of reservations in the adoption of international treaties but 
rather, for example, for the purpose of integrating the model laws and the existing national legal 
system. 
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This proposal differs from earlier attempts in important ways. It is 
not set within the international political system, which suffers from an 
aggregated lack of incentives for states to enforce human rights laws as 
discussed above. Instead, it is structured as a global regulatory proposal. 
This will avoid some of the reasons that states have a disincentive to 
reform and sidestep the uphill battle that has doomed some prior efforts. 
This proposal envisions a global institution that, among other things, 
should be structured in a way to allow it to explicitly address the needs of 
developing countries from a developing country perspective, which is not 
the case for most international institutions.249 This proposal draws on 
theories of Global Corporate Citizenship, which are a recent develop-
ment of the past decade. However, Global Corporate Citizenship is cur-
rently voluntary and this Article is proposing mandatory regulations.250 It 
also proposes universal civil jurisdiction for corporate-related human 
rights abuses, which extends beyond current understandings of universal 
civil jurisdiction.251  
A. Global Law Commission 
The first component of this proposal is a global institution, specifi-
cally, a Global Law Commission. This is an initial proposal that will be 
expanded and refined in a future article entitled Global Law Commis-
sion: Institutionalizing Global Human Rights Regulation of Transna-
tional Corporations (working title). This Section sets out some of the 
options and challenges for a Global Law Commission. 
A Global Law Commission would facilitate effective and simulta-
neous regulation of transnational corporations in multiple jurisdictions.252 
One goal of the Global Law Commission would be to provide countries 
with well-conceived, well-drafted legislation that brings clarity and sta-
bility to this critical area of the law. The Global Law Commission could 
contribute to protecting human rights and providing access to remedies 
for corporate-related human rights abuses. Among other things, the 
Global Law Commission should explicitly address the needs of develop-
ing countries. This Subsection sets out in broad brushstrokes basic con-
tours of a proposal, including formation, membership, level of institu-
tionalization, funding, selection of representatives, transparency of deci-
  
 249. Kunibert Raffer, Some Proposals to Adapt International Institutions to Developmental 
Needs, in THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN GLOBALISATION: THE CHALLENGES OF 
REFORM 81, 81 (John-ren Chen ed., 2003) (“Most international institutions were not drafted for the 
specific needs of so-called ‘developing countries’ . . . .”).  
 250. Anderson, supra note 34, at 29. 
 251. See generally Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of 
Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142 (2006) (discussing universal civil jurisdiction). 
 252. See Mark Tushnet, Keeping Your Eye on the Ball: The Significance of the Revival of 
Constitutional Federalism, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1065, 1067 (1997) (“It seems obvious that only 
transnational political institutions are likely to be in a position to control transnational corpora-
tions.”). 
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sion-making, and the role of the Global Law Commission as an advo-
cate.253  
1. Formation 
The Global Law Commission should be formed in a manner that al-
lows it to act independently of the international legal system while at the 
same time recognizing the interdependent nature of all legal systems. For 
example, like international financial regulatory organizations, the Global 
Law Commission could be informally constituted.254 It should not be 
created through international treaties, as it is not intended to be a creature 
of international law.255  
Instead, the constituting documents of the Global Law Commission 
could be a constitution (or similar document) and bylaws. This is a 
model that has been employed in the creation of successful international 
financial institutions including the Basle Committee on Banking Super-
vision and the International Organization of Securities Commissions.256 
Domestically, it is also the constituting structure of the U.S. National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“U.S. Uniform 
Law Commission”).257 This structure would facilitate the operation of the 
Global Law Commission as a global administrative and regulatory insti-
tution rather than a political institution. It would also allow the bylaws to 
be “broad and flexible.”258  
2. Membership 
The membership of the Global Law Commission should be com-
posed of commissioners who represent the people of the world. In the 
Global Law Commission, states would not be members.259 This Subsec-
  
 253. David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI. 
J. INT’L L. 547, 569–71 (2005) (developing a model of regulatory cooperation on which these cate-
gories are based). Instead of Zaring’s term “proselytizer,” this Article uses the term “advocate.” 
 254. See id. at 569–71 (discussing a model of regulatory cooperation based on common fea-
tures of international law of the Basle Committee, the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions, and their successors).  
 255. See id. 
 256. See Zaring, supra note 244, at 282. International financial regulatory cooperation is one 
area in which institutions and rules have been successfully developed. Id. at 282; see also David 
Zaring, Three Challenges for Regulatory Networks, 43 INT’L LAW. 211, 211–17 (2009) (discussing 
the evolution and effectiveness of regulatory networks); Zaring, supra note 253, at 549 (discussing 
the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions). 
 257. The Uniform Law Commission has existed in the United States for over 100 years. Unif. 
Law Comm’n., NCCUSL HOME, at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2010). The 
Uniform Law Commission “provides states with non-partisan, well-conceived and well-drafted 
legislation that brings clarity and stability to critical areas of the law.” Id. Historically, the Uniform 
Law Commission has made numerous contributions including resolving conflict-of-law issues, 
facilitating commerce, and advancing reciprocity and remedies between states. Chato Hazelbaker, 
National Legislation, One State at a Time, 66-DEC BENCH & B. MINN. 22, 23 (2009). 
 258. Zaring, supra note 253, at 570 (stating that “many treaties that create traditional interna-
tional organizations” are “specific, detailed, and constraining”). 
 259. See id. at 569. 
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tion discusses initial proposals for the selection of members of the Global 
Law Commission. Other issues that will need to be addressed include 
determining criteria for membership and the size of the Global Law 
Commission, specifically the minimum and maximum number of mem-
bers.  
One option is to allow only national governments to appoint or 
nominate commissioners in a process that is similar to that used for the 
U.S. Uniform Law Commission or the International Law Commission.260 
A downside to this membership structure is individual countries’ ability 
to interfere in the process by simply refusing to appoint or nominate 
commissioners. However, this could be remedied by giving the Global 
Law Commission the power to request the body that regulates the legal 
profession in that country to make appointments or nominations—
assuming that the body regulating the legal profession is able to act inde-
pendently. More significantly, it is inherently inconsistent and problem-
atic to base membership selection on the international legal system since 
the global law system is intended to function in parallel with but not be 
dependent on the international legal system. If national governments 
appoint or nominate the commissioners, then they are arguably represen-
tatives of countries even if the Global Law Commission is structured to 
ensure them as much independence as possible.  
Instead, one alternative for membership selection is proportional 
representation. The Global Law Commission would have a fixed or 
flexible—within a certain range—number of members. The commission-
ers could be allocated proportionally, for example, by continent accord-
ing to population or other criteria and the allocation could be reviewed 
and revised at set intervals. This would reflect the nature of the Global 
Law Commission as a global institution rather than an international insti-
tution.  
Commissioners could be nominated by national governments, 
NGOs, bodies that regulate the legal profession, as well other institu-
tional actors. To be elected, nominees would need to meet the criteria set 
for membership in the Global Law Commission. Institutions that are 
given the right to nominate could also constitute the body that elects the 
commissioners from those nominated based on a one-entity, one-vote 
principle. One challenge associated with this option is determining which 
institutions and groups would have the right to make nominations. A 
benefit of this mode of selection would be to expand the pool of nomina-
tors and, thus, the pool of potential nominees. It would also serve to de-
  
 260. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION CONST. art. II, available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ 
DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=3&tabid=18; UNITED NATIONS, THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW COMMISSION, 8–17 (Vol. I, 2007); JEFFREY S. MORTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW 
COMMISSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS 10-12 (2000); and SIR IAN SINCLAIR, THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW COMMISSION 13-21 (1987).  
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crease the level of control by national governments but recognize the 
importance of national governments and the interconnection and interde-
pendency of all legal orders of the world.  
Another issue that will need to be addressed is the possibility of 
creating multiple forms of membership, such as ex officio membership in 
addition to elected membership, and the advantages and disadvantages of 
these alternative forms. Having different forms of membership would 
make it possible to select commissioners in more than one way. For ex-
ample, some percentage of the commissioners could be nominated and 
elected among national governments, some could be nominated and 
elected by NGOs and other institutional actors, and some could be nomi-
nated and elected by bodies that regulate the legal profession. Allocating 
certain percentages of commissioners to certain interest groups such as 
national governments would help garner support from those groups for 
the Global Law Commission’s work. However, this might expose the 
Global Law Commission’s work to becoming more political than regula-
tory. 
3. Institutionalization 
The Global Law Commission should meet at regular intervals, for 
example annually, to draft model uniform laws in key human rights areas 
affected by transnational corporations. In addition, it is likely that the 
Global Law Commission would need to continue work on ongoing pro-
jects in committees. Committees could be determined based on substan-
tive areas or type of tasks. Substantive committees offer an advantage 
because they allow the clustering of substantive expertise. However, task 
oriented committees may present a better option because the make-up of 
the committee would bring together people with varying substantive ex-
pertise who, together, have the skills and knowledge to achieve the 
committee’s assigned tasks.  
The Global Law Commission should have a permanent presence. 
Either a small permanent presence or a more substantial permanent pres-
ence would have their benefits. A small permanent presence would keep 
costs, and thus the need for funding, low.261 A more substantial perma-
nent presence would cost more but would allow the Global Law Com-
mission to operate year-round. However, an increased need for funds 
amplifies questions about sources of funding and the level of influence of 
governments and intuitions providing those funds. 
4. Funding 
Funding will be a significant factor in the size and success of the 
Global Law Commission’s administrative apparatus. The level of fund-
  
 261. Zaring, supra note 253, at 571 (stating that international financial regulatory organizations 
“have little permanent presence” and “[t]heir annual budgets are minute”). 
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ing required will depend in large part on whether the Global Law Com-
mission has a large or small permanent presence. The larger the perma-
nent presence, the greater the need will be for funding.262 However, fund-
ing will be a less significant factor if the commissioners work on a vol-
unteer basis and are not compensated. Nonetheless, some minimal fund-
ing would be necessary, even for volunteer commissioners, to defray 
expenses. 
Contributions from interested parties such as national governments 
are one likely source of funding for the Global Law Commission. States 
would need to have an incentive to contribute to the Global Law Com-
mission. One incentive for states would be that they could receive legal 
expertise in the form of drafting of uniform laws worth millions of dol-
lars. Many individual states could not otherwise afford the cost of this 
type of legal expertise.263  
5. Transparency 
Ensuring a high level of transparency can help the Global Law 
Commission gain and maintain legitimacy. One question is whether 
meetings of the commission should be open to the public.264 Open meet-
ings may increase accessibility for those who have the time and financial 
resources to attend. However, on a global scale, open meetings may also 
create and legitimize preferential access for more influential actors and 
exclude interested parties with fewer resources. In addition, open meet-
ings may stifle open and frank discussion.  
Instead, the Global Law Commission should have a forum for pub-
licizing drafts and accepting comments from interested parties.265 The 
Global Law Commission should also commit to making a wide range of 
relevant documents available online.266 Ensuring an opportunity for pub-
lic comment on drafts via the Internet will increase transparency—
assuming that the opportunity to comment is widely publicized in a man-
ner that reaches interested parties. 
  
 262. See id. This discussion is intended only to raise the complex and fundamental issue of 
state support, in particular financial support. The question of securing state support will be analyzed 
in greater detail in a future article entitled Global Law Commission: Institutionalizing Global Human 
Rights Regulation of Transnational Corporations (working title).  
 263. Financial Support, NCCUSL, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx? 
tabindex=0&tabid=11 (last visited on Oct. 31, 2010) (drawing from the Uniform Law Commission 
model). 
 264. This draws from the U.S. Uniform Law Commission model. UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION. 
art. XLI. In contrast, international financial regulatory organization meetings are generally not open 
to the public. Zaring, supra note 253, at 571 (“[International financial regulatory organizations] 
generally operate through closed meetings . . . .”). 
 265. See Zaring, supra note 253, at 571 (“[T]he Basle Committee and [International Organiza-
tion of Securities Commissions] . . . make an effort to invite comment from interested parties on 
their most significant regulatory efforts.”). 
 266. Id. at 571–72 (discussing a practice that has become common among international finan-
cial regulatory organizations).  
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6. Advocacy 
Model laws drafted by the Global Law Commission can contribute 
to the development of both soft and hard law. Like other documents writ-
ten by international organizations and NGOs, model laws drafted by the 
Global Law Commission may influence soft-law norms and contribute to 
the enactment of hard law. Model laws drafted by the Global Law Com-
mission for domestic implementation would need to be passed by na-
tional governments to be enforceable in domestic courts. This could 
change if, at a later stage, a global court is established or countries sign 
onto conventions to enforce alternative dispute resolution or universal 
civil jurisdiction for claims related to corporate-related human rights 
violations.  
Encouraging national governments to implement draft laws in their 
jurisdiction will be an important role for the Global Law Commission.267 
Like international financial regulatory organizations, the Global Law 
Commission would need to work actively to disseminate best practices. 
In addition, the Global Law Commission could advocate for and play a 
role in drafting conventions to enforce forms of alternative dispute reso-
lution or universal civil jurisdiction as well as the creation of a global 
court.  
Implementing the Global Law Commission will not be simple or 
without challenges. One of the key challenges is how to get countries on 
board with the Global Law Commission and enact the model laws devel-
oped by the Global Law Commission. However, there are examples that 
can provide insights into avenues that may lead to success. For example, 
forty-two countries adhere—more or less—to the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises.268 An examination of the strengths and weak-
nesses of that process can provide valuable insights. Further, an analysis 
of why the United States became a member of the United Nations but not 
the League of Nations, and why the United States signed onto the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade but not the International Trade Or-
ganization offers an opportunity to identify factors that may encourage 
countries like the United States to support—or at least accept—the 
Global Law Commission. 
B. Global Laws and Regulations 
The second component of this proposal is the development of global 
laws and regulations by the Global Law Commission informed by a the-
  
 267. Id. at 572 (discussing the proselytizing roles played by international financial regulatory 
organizations). 
 268. Directorate for Fin. & Enter. Affairs, The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enter-
prises: Frequently Asked Questions, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3343,en_2649_34889_2349370_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 
on Oct. 31, 2010). 
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ory of Law and Global Corporate Citizenship.269 This is an initial pro-
posal that will be expanded and refined in a future article entitled A Le-
gal Theory of Global Corporate Citizenship: Reimagining Global Regu-
lation of Transnational Corporations (working title). Existing legal the-
ory does not provide a viable framework in which to adequately address 
the effects of corporate activities on human rights. In addition to the 
weaknesses in international human rights law discussed above, theories 
of corporate law and foreign direct investment law are also inadequate to 
comprehensively theorize and regulate the intersection of transnational 
economic activity and human rights.270 Because there is not an adequate 
theoretical framework to address issues raised by the effects of transna-
tional corporations on individuals’ and communities’ enjoyment of their 
human rights, corporate-related human rights abuses remain on the pe-
riphery of law and theory. 
In corporate law and theory in the United States, corporations are 
generally depicted as economic entities that should be regulated by the 
market through economic incentives and mechanisms.271 This position is 
solidly established at the heart of American corporate legal theory.272 
However, there is a minority in the United States that argues that corpo-
rations are economic and social entities.273 This minority often identifies 
with the Corporate Social Responsibility movement.274 This line of ar-
gument does not limit the means of controlling corporations to economic 
incentives. Nonetheless, it remains on the periphery of U.S. corporate 
legal theory and is not likely to become a central tenet of U.S. corporate 
law and theory anytime in the near future.  
Lacking traction in corporate law and theory, we might logically 
turn to the web of domestic laws, bilateral investment treaties, and other 
international law that govern foreign direct investment. However, foreign 
  
 269. Although the development of model global laws does not reduce the need for plaintiffs to 
have the financial capacity to bring suits, adherence to human rights-related laws and norms by 
transnational corporations can reduce the need for plaintiffs to bring suits by reducing the occurrence 
of corporate-related human rights abuses. See Backer, supra note 247, at 351–54. 
 270. Similar arguments can be made for other areas of law and theory, for example, law and 
development. 
 271. Backer, supra note 247, at 296–98 (“The state was to define the parameters within which 
this flexible framework could be effected and policed, but otherwise the market was to provide the 
mechanism for regulating corporate activity.”).  
 272. Id. at 296–99 (tracing this position back to the acceptance of arguments made by Adolph 
Berle in a debate with E. Merrick Dodd in the 1930s); see also A. A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as 
Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931) (discussing the impact of corporate actions 
taken serve to benefit its shareholders); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1145–47 (1932) (discussing the purpose and function of the 
corporate structure). 
 273. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporations Theory and Corporate Governance Law: Corpo-
rate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 705, 716 
(2002).  
 274. The exact scope and contours of Corporate Social Responsibility are disputed within the 
U.S. legal discourse. See id. at 711–20 (categorizing positions taken on CSR in the U.S. legal dis-
course). 
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direct investment is generally thought of as a primarily economic activity 
and the laws governing such activities reflect those assumptions.275 
Purely domestic laws often fall prey to lax enforcement in the face of 
government goals to bring in funds and promote economic development 
through foreign investment.276 Bilateral and other international agree-
ments between countries tend to focus on protecting their own natural 
and legal citizens’ foreign investments from expropriation and naturali-
zation without appropriate compensation.277 It is unlikely that the protec-
tion of the rights and interests of non-citizens will be given a higher pri-
ority than the protection of a state’s own citizens and economic interests 
in foreign direct investment law. Thus, the regulation of the negative 
environmental and human rights effects of corporations is likely to re-
main on the periphery of foreign direct investment law and theory. 
However, theoretical advancements have been made in other disci-
plines. Global Corporate Citizenship is a body of theoretical work ini-
tially developed in the management and business literature in the late 
1990s that could provide a strong basis for developing global laws to 
regulate transnational corporations.278 Over the past decade, a robust 
Global Corporate Citizenship literature has developed in the business and 
management fields.279 This literature argues for voluntary initiatives by 
transnational corporations.280 The rationale for transnational corporations 
  
 275. See Dr. Elfraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Investment Treaties: A De Facto 
Multilateral Agreement?, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 303, 328 (2009). 
 276. This problem should be addressed in part by universal civil jurisdiction, which would 
allow plaintiffs to bring cases in courts of countries with a record of more consistent enforcement. 
See Donovan & Roberts, supra note 251, 142–46 (“[U]niversal jurisdiction provides a mechanism 
for enhancing accountability.”). 
 277. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment, and 
the Rule of (International) Law: Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 805, 808 (2008) (“Most BITs contain a common core of substantive promises to investors, 
including rights to some combination of ‘most-favored nation,’ national, ‘non-discriminatory,’ or 
‘fair and equitable’ ‘treatment’; rights to ‘full protection and security’; rights to ‘prompt, adequate, 
and effective’ compensation in the event of expropriation or of government measures ‘tantamount to 
expropriation’; and the right to transfer investment assets or proceeds out of the host state in con-
vertible currency.”). 
 278. See LOGAN, ROY & RUGELBRUGGE, supra note 96, at 13, 16. 
 279. See, e.g., LOGAN, ROY & RUGELBRUGGE, supra note 96, at 6–7; James E. Post & Shawn 
L. Berman, Global Corporate Citizenship in a Dot.com World: The Role of Organisational Identity, 
in PERSPECTIVES ON CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP 66, 66–67 (Jörg Andriof & Malcolm McIntosh eds., 
2001); Jeanne M. Logsdon & Donna J. Wood, Business Citizenship: From Domestic to Global Level 
of Analysis, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q., no. 2, 2002, at 155; James E. Post, Global Corporate Citizenship: 
Principles to Live and Work By, 12 BUS. ETHICS Q., no. 2, 2002, at 143, 148–49 [hereinafter Princi-
ples to Live and Work By]; James E. Post, Moving from Geographic to Virtual Communities: Global 
Corporate Citizenship in a Dot.com World, 105 BUS. & SOC. REV. 27, 27–29 (2000); Klaus Schwab, 
Global Corporate Citizenship: Working With Governments and Civil Society, 87 FOREIGN AFF. 107, 
107–108 (2008); Sandra Waddock & Neil Smith, Relationships: The Real Challenge of Global 
Corporate Citizenship, 105 BUS. & SOC. REV. 47, 47–49 (2000); Grahame Thompson, Tracking 
Global Citizenship: Some Reflections on ‘Lovesick’ Companies 1–2 (Inst. for Int’l Integration Stud-
ies, Discussion Paper No. 192, 2006), available at https://www.tcd.ie/iiis/documents/ 
discussion/pdfs/iiisdp192.pdf. 
 280. See generally Schwab, supra note 269, at 107–18 (discussing participation and benefits in 
engaging in global corporate citizenship and corporate social responsibility).  
File: Anderson_FinalProof_12711.doc Created on: 1/27/11 6:12 PM Last Printed: 1/28/11 7:16 AM 
226 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1 
 
to undertake these initiatives is that they have economic benefits for the 
corporations in addition to being beneficial for society.281  
However, one danger of relying on voluntary measures is that they 
themselves often rely on the flawed assumptions of a purely economic 
analysis of business management. Purely economic analyses of business 
choices are susceptible to over-reliance on quantitative tools.282 Overreli-
ance on quantitative tools is often accompanied by a disregard for moral 
and cultural factors, which artificially limits our understanding of issues 
and the range of corresponding regulatory options.283 Instead, some 
scholars argue for a “deeply human-centered conception of business” 
that “depend[s] on the exercise of virtue, respect for dignity, and a shared 
sense of the common good.”284 Voluntary measures are also problematic 
because the self-interests of transnational corporations may not always 
align with societal interests. In such situations, voluntary measures are 
often—at most—a minimal but not dispositive incentive.  
Global Corporate Citizenship literature builds on corporate citizen-
ship literature by expanding it to the global sphere. Global Corporate 
Citizenship initiatives have garnered the attention and support of transna-
tional corporations.285 At the international level, the Global Compact, a 
United Nations initiative, has promoted a set of values that are aligned 
with theories of Global Corporate Citizenship.286 However, the voluntary 
nature of these initiatives exposes them to the same weaknesses as other 
voluntary measures—transnational corporations can pick and choose 
among measures. From a business perspective, this is beneficial because 
it allows managers and directors to choose measures that suit their con-
text and that fit their business modes.287 From a human rights perspec-
tive, this is a disadvantage because voluntary norms and standards do not 
require transnational corporations to consider, recognize, or adhere to 
any domestic or international norms or standards such as international 
  
 281. See Principles to Live and Work By, supra note 279, 143–44, 148.  
 282. Kevin T. Jackson, The Scandal Beneath the Financial Crisis: Getting a View from a 
Moral-Cultural Mental Model, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 735, 746–47 (2010) (stating that the 
trend of increasing mathematization of science “is not as suitable for examining a broad range of 
phenomena—such as institutions, values, culture, and traditions—that clearly have an enormous 
bearing on economic life.”).  
 283. Id. at 747 (quoting WILHELM RÖPKE, A HUMANE ECONOMY: THE SOCIAL FRAMEWORK 
OF THE FREE MARKET 247 (Elizabeth Henderson trans., 1960) (lamenting the decline of morality in 
economics)). 
 284. Id. at 752–53 (“[The] human-centered conception of business is supported by a long 
tradition of thought common to ancient cultures.”) (citing SAMUEL GREGG, THE COMMERCIAL 
SOCIETY: FOUNDATIONS AND CHALLENGES IN A GLOBAL AGE 9 (2007)). 
 285. Anderson, supra note 34, at 22–23. 
 286. The Ten Principles, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact. 
org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited on Oct. 31, 2010). 
 287. Cf. Jackson, supra note 282, at 758 (stating that reactionary corporate social responsibility 
measures may be disadvantageous when companies are “placed under strict accountability, compli-
ance, and enforcement demands in utter disregard of the type and character of the business at hand 
the conditions under which it might prosper”). 
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human rights law.288 Further, such voluntary measures are often reaction-
ary and piecemeal rather than proactive and comprehensive.289 
Although Global Corporate Citizenship is well developed in the 
management and business literature, it is not yet firmly established in 
legal scholarship.290 In the business and management context, it is an 
evolving voluntary practice. Businesses are supposed to be good corpo-
rate citizens because it makes business sense—there are economic bene-
fits. In the legal context, mandatory Global Corporate Citizenship is 
more appropriate when core values such as human rights are at issue. 
Mandatory laws and regulations are better suited to ensuring compliance 
and recourse to enforcement than voluntary ones. Thus, it is important to 
develop mandatory regulations in addition to voluntary initiatives.  
There are four principles of Corporate Citizenship: Minimize Harm; 
Maximize Benefit; Accountability and Responsiveness to Key 
Stakeholders; and Strong Financial Return.291 The first principle of Cor-
porate Citizenship is Minimize Harm, which is defined as: 
Work[ing] to minimize the negative consequences of business activi-
ties and decisions on stakeholders, including employees, customers, 
communities, ecosystems, shareholders and suppliers. Examples in-
clude operating ethically, supporting efforts to stop corruption, 
championing human rights, preventing environmental harm, enforc-
ing good conduct from suppliers, treating employees responsibly, en-
suring the safety of employees, ensuring that marketing statements 
are accurate, and delivering safe, high-quality products.292 
The second principle of Corporate Citizenship is Maximize Benefit, 
defined as: 
“Contribut[ing] to societal and economic well-being by investing re-
sources in activities that benefit shareholders as well as broader 
stakeholders.” Examples include participating voluntarily to help ad-
dress social issues (such as education, health, youth development, 
economic development for low-income communities, and work force 
  
 288. Donovan & Roberts, supra note 251, at 145.  
 289. See Jackson, supra note 282, at 758 (“Under the ‘corporate social responsibility’ ap-
proach, the province of ‘business ethics’ gets denigrated to harum-scarum stratagems formulated as 
reactions to alarms sounded by ‘stakeholders’ that are in turn dictated by galleries of activists pur-
porting to be their appointed representatives.”). Jackson critiques such measures and argues that such 
measures are often aimed at “promoting politically correct agendas.” Id. 
 290. See Anderson, supra note 34, at 23–24.  
 291. E-mail from Susan Thomas, Assistant Dir., Boston College Center for Corporate Citizen-
ship, to Sarah Millard, Executive Editor, Denver University Law Review (Sept. 16, 2010, 15:59 
MDT) (on file with Denver University Law Review) (This was originally posted in on the Boston 
College Center for Corporate Citizenship website as What is Corporate Citizenship?, BOSTON 
COLLEGE CENTER FOR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP.) [hereinafter Boston College]. These principles are 
no longer listed on the Boston College Center for Corporate Citizenship website. However, I con-
tinue to use them here because I believe they set out a solid initial framework for corporate citizen-
ship.  
 292. Id. 
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development), ensuring stable employment, paying fair wages, and 
producing a product with social value.293 
The third principle of Corporate Citizenship is Accountability and 
Responsiveness to Key Stakeholders, which has two parts.294 The first 
part of the third principle is “[b]uild[ing] relationships of trust that in-
volve becoming more transparent and open about the progress and set-
backs businesses experience in an effort to operate ethically.”295 The 
second part of the third principle is “[c]reat[ing] mechanisms to include 
the voice of stakeholders in governance, produce social reports assured 
by third parties, operate according to a code of conduct and listen to and 
communicate with stakeholders.”296 Examples include creating mecha-
nisms to include the voice of stakeholders in governance, producing so-
cial reports assured by third parties, operating according to a code of 
conduct, and listening to and communicating with stakeholders.297 
Finally, the fourth principle of Corporate Citizenship is a Strong Fi-
nancial Return; this is defined as “return[ing] a profit to shareholders.”298 
Business and management scholars have expressed the view that the re-
sponsibility of a company to return a profit to shareholders must always 
be considered part of its obligation to society.299 
Developing uniform model laws informed by principles of Global 
Corporate Citizenship will require, among other things, transforming 
voluntary guidelines and standards into mandatory and enforceable rules 
and regulations.300 The first principle of Corporate Citizenship, Minimiz-
ing Harm, requires transnational corporations to minimize negative ef-
fects on all categories of stakeholders.301 In many ways, a legal standard 
of Minimizing Harm could parallel this standard as it is set out in the 
business and management literature. However, in a legal framework, 
Minimizing Harm and sector-specific standards would be legally man-
dated. These would need to be enforceable under law to encourage com-
pliance and provide legal avenues for redress. Such standards already 
exist in a variety of areas such as the environment and labor law. In some 
ways, developing laws to address this element are the easiest because 
they fit easily into existing models that prohibit harmful behavior. Laws 
  
 293. Id. 
 294. Id. 
 295. Id. 
 296. Id. 
 297. Id. 
 298. See id. 
 299. H. Jeff Smith, The Shareholders v. Stakeholders Debate, 44 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 85, 
85–86 (2003) (discussing the rationale for profit in both shareholder and stakeholder theories of 
management). 
 300. Options for lawmaking will need to be worked through in detail but this goes beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
 301. Boston College, supra note 291. 
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in this category could include and build on concepts developed in the 
context of Corporate Social Responsibility. 
As a legal standard, the second principle of Corporate Citizenship, 
Maximizing Benefit, would require by law affirmative steps on the part of 
transnational corporations to contribute to societal and economic well 
being. This would go beyond the investment of resources in activities 
that benefit various groups of stakeholders. Laws requiring Maximizing 
Benefit(s) would need to be informed by research that explores what 
kinds of laws create positive incentives. One way to maximize the bene-
fits of foreign direct investment is for transnational corporations to exert 
positive influence over things like water and sanitation,302 property 
rights,303 and entrepreneurial skills and capabilities.304 This may be one 
of the most controversial principles of corporate citizenship in a legal 
context, particularly from the perspective of U.S. scholars and decision 
makers. 
The third principle of Corporate Citizenship, Accountability and Re-
sponsiveness to Key Stakeholders would require standards and transpar-
ency in a legal context.305 It would differ from the business and manage-
ment perspectives because it would not focus on developing trust, which 
is an essential goal of voluntary businesses relationships. Instead, it 
would stem from the idea that transnational corporations have duties and 
obligations to specific groups of stakeholders and to society as whole. In 
a mandatory legal framework, this principle could encompass the setting 
of standards for ethical business operation. It would also include core 
principles of corporate citizenship in the business and management lit-
erature, such as stakeholder participation and third party monitoring306 
Laws in this category could include and build on those developed in the 
context of Corporate Social Accountability. 
For a mandatory legal framework, this Article proposes a substan-
tive change to the fourth principle of Corporate Citizenship. Rather than 
a Strong Financial Return, a legal framework could instead require a 
Competitive Financial Return. This would be a shift from traditional 
profit-maximization models, which go further than the goal of a Strong 
  
 302. U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2008: 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE INFRASTRUCTURE CHALLENGE, at 140 , U.N. Sales No. 
E.08.II.D.23 (2008), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/wir2008_en.pdf (discussing the 
effects of the lack of water and sanitation on child mortality, maternal health and gender equality). 
 303. See, e.g., Leslie Kurshan, Rethinking Property Rights as Human Rights: Acquiring Equal 
Property Rights for Women Using International Human Rights Treaties, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 353, 357–59 (2000). 
 304. See OECD, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT: MAXIMIZING BENEFITS, 
MINIMIZING COSTS 14–15 (2002) (discussing potential for multinational corporations to enhance 
entrepreneurial capacity in developing countries), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/51/ 
1959815.pdf. 
 305. Boston College, supra note 291. 
 306. See id. 
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Financial Return.307 Achieving a Strong Financial Return is a goal for a 
corporation and its officers and directors.308 It is an internal guideline. 
Achieving a Competitive Financial Return is a standard that can be bal-
anced against industry norms and practices as well as the other three 
principles of corporate citizenship. A Competitive Financial Return stan-
dard would allow corporations to consider the interests of stakeholders 
other than shareholders. In contrast to a Strong Financial Return, a Com-
petitive Financial Return is an external standard that should be deter-
mined with consideration of external factors. In a legal context, appropri-
ate legislation would need to be enacted to give transnational corpora-
tions an incentive to balance economic goals with socio-political goals.  
This proposal is structured to be compatible with the U.N. Frame-
work. Transnational corporations’ effects on human rights have been the 
focus of recent work by John Ruggie’s team under the auspices of the 
United Nations.309 Ruggie and his team have developed a “protect, re-
spect, and remedy framework,” also known as the U.N. Framework, that 
can serve as a foundation for further work in this area.310  
Integrating Global Corporate Citizenship into the U.N. Framework 
will allow for the development of a more robust and comprehensive sys-
tem. Imagine then a matrix in which to classify global lawmaking. The x-
axis would be populated by the categories of protect, respect, and remedy 
from the U.N. Framework. The y-axis would be populated by the four 
principles of corporate citizenship. Laws would be classified by their 
position at the intersection of the x- and y-axes.  
Simply drafting model global laws has the potential to create soft 
law and encourage practices that reduce or prevent corporate-related 
human rights abuses. However, without hard law, potential plaintiffs 
would not be able to seek judicial or other enforcement of their rights. 
The next Section sets out an initial proposal for enforcement, the final 
element of this proposal. 
  
 307. See Smith, supra note 299, at 85 (“As Milton Friedman wrote, ‘There is one and only one 
social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase 
its profits so long as it . . . engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.’” 
(alteration in original)). 
 308. See Boston College, supra note 291 (articulating principle of “support[ing] strong finan-
cial results” using normative rather than binding language). 
 309. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Trans-
national Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Further Steps 
Toward the Operationalization of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/14/27 (April 9, 2010) (by John Ruggie), available at http://www.reports-and-
materials.org/Ruggie-report-2010.pdf; Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue 
of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect 
and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, U.N. Doc A/HRC/8/5 (April 7, 2008) 
(by John Ruggie), available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf. 
 310. Id. 
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C. Global Enforcement  
The rights of victims of corporate-related human rights abuses are 
under-enforced and, therefore, the third component of this proposal is the 
expansion of adjudicatory and enforcement options.311 This expansion 
should help compensate for the fact that some states enforce and adjudi-
cate fewer claims or adjudicate less consistently than others. This pro-
posal envisions adjudication of claims of corporate-related human rights 
abuses in domestic courts and universal civil jurisdiction for corporate-
related human rights abuses.312 However, it does not exclude the possibil-
ity of a global court or convention on enforcement of alternative forms of 
dispute resolution in the future.313 This is an initial proposal that will be 
expanded and refined in a future article entitled Universal Civil Jurisdic-
tion: Adjudicating Corporate-Related Human Rights Abuses (working 
title). Universal civil jurisdiction would allow civil claims of corporate-
related human rights abuses to be brought in domestic courts regardless 
of the nationality of the parties or the location and effects of the con-
duct.314  
Universal civil jurisdiction should be established for the limited 
scope of corporate-related human rights abuses. In a multinational con-
text, jurisdiction is generally determined by domestic and international 
rules.315 Universal civil jurisdiction would make it possible to bring a 
civil suit against a transnational corporation for corporate-related human 
rights abuses by any plaintiff in a domestic court in any country. One 
issue raised by universal civil jurisdiction is how to prevent unfairly 
overburdening the courts of any one jurisdiction.  
  
 311. This is an initial proposal that I am expanding and refining in a forthcoming article enti-
tled Toward Global Adjudication and Enforcement of Corporate-Related Human Rights Abuses 
(working title). 
 312. See Beth Van Shaack, Justice Without Borders: Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 99 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 120, 122 (2005) (arguing that “[s]upranational mechanisms will never sup-
plant domestic proceedings, so domestic courts will continue to play a central role in enforcing 
international law”); see also Dubinsky, supra note 225, at 306 (arguing that “[b]ecause much that is 
productive has come out of human rights adjudication to date, because the phenomenon is still fairly 
recent, and because there is not much that suggests it is harmful, we should go forward with a series 
of rebuttable presumptions: that victims of fundamental human rights treaty violations should not be 
beyond effective judicial protection; that alleged perpetrators should not enjoy impunity; that courts, 
as institutions best designed to provide fair process and decision-making insulated from political 
pressure, are appropriate for dealing with guilt, punishment, liability, and compensation”). 
 313. See Dubinsky, supra note 225, at 307–12 (comparing the advantages and disadvantages of 
international vs. domestic courts). 
 314. See Menno T. Kamminga, Universal Civil Jurisdiction: Is it Legal? Is it Desirable?, 99 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 123, 123 (2005) (defining universal civil jurisdiction as “the principle 
under which civil proceedings may be brought in a domestic court irrespective of the location of the 
unlawful conduct and irrespective of the nationality of the perpetrator or the victim, on the grounds 
that the unlawful conduct is a matter of international concern”).  
 315. See generally Born, supra note 202, at 11–22 (conducting comparative assessment of 
jurisdiction determinations among national courts facing transnational controversies). 
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Existing international law does not explicitly authorize universal 
civil jurisdiction.316 However, universal civil jurisdiction also is not in-
consistent with international law.317 Thus, an expansion of universal civil 
jurisdiction is not precluded under international law. The Global Law 
Commission could contribute to ensuring the enforceability of universal 
civil jurisdiction by helping establish and advocating for soft-law norms 
that eventually could become customary international law. Another way 
to establish universal civil jurisdiction would be via an international con-
vention. This would not undermine the development of global law but 
rather would reflect the interconnectedness and interdependency of 
global law and international law. 
A Global Law Commission and the uniform model laws promul-
gated by the Global Law Commission should define the types of conduct 
to which universal civil jurisdiction would apply. The scope of relevant 
conduct should be broader than the types of tort claims that have been 
permitted, for example, under the U.S. Alien Tort Statute.318 In addition, 
it should explicitly apply to conduct by and claims against transnational 
corporations.319 However, it would not have to include every form of 
conduct that impinges on a human right enumerated in uniform model 
laws as drafted by the Global Law Commission. Further, universal civil 
jurisdiction should not prevent tort claims from being brought in pro-
ceedings based on universal criminal jurisdiction.  
CONCLUSION 
One of the most important issues in human rights law today is the 
role of corporations. The crisis of corporate-related human rights abuses 
demands a response. Corporate-related activities continue to cause harm 
  
 316. See Kamminga, supra note 314, at 123–24 (claiming that “[n]o rule of international law 
specifically authorizes let alone obliges the exercise of universal civil jurisdiction in respect of 
human rights offenders”). 
 317. See id. at 124 (discussing the lack of objections to U.S. courts’ exercise of universal civil 
jurisdiction for alien tort claims); cf. Shaack, supra note 312, at 120 (claiming that “[i]nternational 
law authorizes universal civil jurisdiction”). 
 318. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); Sosa v. Alverez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004) (requir-
ing ATCA claims “based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of international charac-
ter accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 
18th-century paradigms [the Court has] recognized,” namely violation of safe conducts, infringe-
ment of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy). See generally William S. Dodge, Which Torts in 
Violation of the Law of Nations?, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 351 (2001) for a discussion 
of the types of torts that are actionable under the Alien Tort Statute. See generally Richard M. Bux-
baum & David D. Caron, The Alien Tort Statute: An Overview of the Current Issues, 28 BERKELEY 
J. INT’L L. 513 (2010) for issues in Alien Tort Statute jurisprudence.  
 319. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (finding that 
Alien Tort Claims Act does not apply to corporate defendants). See generally David A. Dana & 
Michael Barsa, Three Obstacles to the Promotion of Corporate Social Responsibility by Means of 
the Alien Tort Claims Act: The Sosa Court’s Incoherent Conception of the Law of Nations, The 
‘Purposive’ Action Requirement for Aiding and Abetting, and The State Action Requirement for 
Primary Liability, FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1711934, for a discussion of obstacles inhibiting successful claims against 
transnational corporations. 
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around the world in every area of human rights. This Article has argued 
that the current state-centered international human rights regime is in-
adequate to respond comprehensively to this pressing problem.  
At least three questions are central to determining whether corpo-
rate-related human rights abuses present a problem of sufficient impor-
tance and consequence that they can be adequately addressed only with a 
new legal and regulatory regime. First, is there a deficit in domestic and 
international regulation of transnational corporations? Second, what are 
possible explanations for this deficit? Third, what are the effects of this 
deficit? This Article has attempted to answer each of these questions as 
well as others. However, there are many questions that remain unan-
swered that will be explored in more depth in a series of future articles. 
Understanding corporate-related human rights abuses, their causes, 
and the reasons they persist requires the analysis of a series of secondary 
questions. These include questions that focus on existing structures as 
well as questions that are forward looking. What is the current system for 
regulating transnational corporations, who makes the rules, and who con-
trols implementation and monitoring? What are the goals of the current 
system and is it achieving those goals? What are the assumptions under-
lying the current system and are they accurate? How does the system 
work and what parts are working or not working? If the system is not 
working, why is it not working? Are the parts that are not working im-
portant, who does this affect, and how?  
What needs to be done to improve the regulation of transnational 
corporations? Do we need new laws, a new system, or even to change the 
way we theorize the regulation of transnational corporations?  
This Article has made two main proposals: (1) decouple and distin-
guish human rights law and international human rights law, and (2) cre-
ate a global human rights law system. This Article argued that it is neces-
sary to understand human rights law as a super-category and interna-
tional human rights law as a sub-category rather than as synonyms. This 
reclassification highlights a deficiency in the development of human 
rights law and creates a space in which to generate and advance other 
areas of human rights law. This Article then proposed global human 
rights law as a new area of human rights law that is well suited to address 
corporate-related human rights abuses.  
Of course, the creation of a new regulatory framework is neither 
simple nor easy. It requires consideration of multiple constituencies with 
a wide range of—sometimes competing—interests. Proposals for in-
creasing regulation may be met with resistance from many directions, 
including states that fear the loss of capital and other benefits from for-
eign direct investment, bureaucrats who fear the loss of power, and com-
panies that fear increased costs. Decision makers may worry about insti-
File: Anderson_FinalProof_12711.doc Created on: 1/27/11 6:12 PM Last Printed: 1/28/11 7:16 AM 
234 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 88:1 
 
tutional competence, administrability of rules, and overburdening exist-
ing enforcement mechanisms. 
This Article made several specific proposals for the development of 
a global human rights law regime: a Global Law Commission, uniform 
model laws and regulations, and universal civil jurisdiction. The empha-
sis of this proposal on global law rather than international law sets it 
apart from many earlier attempts to comprehensively regulate the activi-
ties of transnational corporations. Although implementation of this pro-
posal would take time and would need to be achieved in stages, forward 
progress can be made in all three components of this proposal simultane-
ously.  
One possible critique of this Article stems from the assumptions it 
makes about the role of morality and ethics in theorizing business prac-
tices, assumptions that are disputed in the U.S. legal academy, and in fact 
represent a minority perspective in the United States. However, part of 
the value of an academic discourse is the dialogue itself and the dissec-
tion, agreement, disagreement, and refinement of ideas. Therefore, if, in 
the United States, this Article simply sparks further discussion about 
global law and Global Corporate Citizenship among U.S. legal scholars 
and policy makers, it will have achieved one of its purposes. 
Future articles will need to respond to a number of questions about 
prior and existing measures and attempts in greater detail. First, what 
attempts have been made to account for social considerations in the regu-
lation of transnational corporations? Second, what can we learn from 
prior successes and failures? Third, are global law and Law and Global 
Corporate Citizenship new names for existing initiatives pulled together 
in a systematic way or do they represent completely new frameworks or 
something in between? This Article and earlier articles have begun an-
swering some of these questions. 
An exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of prior and exist-
ing regulatory efforts can be facilitated by answering another set of sec-
ondary questions. These include questions that focus on an assessment of 
specific measures. What is the status quo in academic literature and pol-
icy making? Is Global Corporate Citizenship already influencing law and 
policy and, if so, where and how? Which aspects are working or not 
working? What other types of measures and regulation have been tried in 
the past? Are there successful examples that we can draw from? Are 
there steps that we can take to avoid past failures? Where different ap-
proaches have been used, why were they chosen, what can be gleaned 
from a comparison? Can models that are developed and implemented in 
different countries be adapted to work in other countries or at a global 
level? 
Finally, there are three questions that are arguably central to devel-
oping a new regulatory framework built on a foundation of global law 
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and Law and Global Corporate Citizenship. First, what should be the 
values and goals of a new legal regime? Second, what form should the 
implementation of a new framework take and who should play a role in 
the implementation? Third, how will the new laws and regulations be 
enforced? This Article proposed initial responses to these questions, 
which will be explored in more depth in a series of future articles. 
Moving toward a more comprehensive regulatory framework will 
require the analysis of a final cluster of secondary questions. These are 
set out in sub-groups below. Some questions aim to flesh out values and 
goals. Who should decide what values should inform the new framework 
and from what sources can we draw such values? What steps should be 
taken in the short-, mid-, and long-term? Are there stages or can all parts 
of a new system be implemented simultaneously?  
Other questions aim to assess what is needed to achieve the creation 
of a new regulatory regime. Is the existing literature sufficient or do we 
need more research? What types of data and studies would be useful? 
What is required to garner sufficient state support and participation in a 
global system? Who will fund a global legal system? Will this new 
global law system require new institutions and laws and, if so, what form 
should they take?  
Some questions focus on roles and responsibilities. Who would be 
responsible for developing a Global Corporate Citizenship approach? 
What institutions will be involved? Is there a role for corporations in the 
development of a new framework and, if so, what is it?  
Further questions would address the purpose of a new regulatory 
system and those who would benefit from or oppose such a framework. 
What would be the purpose and goals of a new institution and laws? 
Who would benefit from the new regulatory regime? Are there groups or 
institutions on which the new framework would have a detrimental ef-
fect? Who would be opposed to this approach and why? 
Finally, it is also necessary to address questions of administrability. 
How would we administer and monitor the effectiveness of this ap-
proach? What structures should be set up to carry out this evaluation? 
How much will this approach cost and how can we achieve sustainabil-
ity? What would be some of the stumbling blocks and how could we 
address them?  
Some people may find the conclusion of this Article with more 
questions than answers unsatisfying. They may be even more unsatisfied 
to learn that the many questions noted here are not exhaustive. However, 
I believe this reflects the fact that this is the beginning of a large project 
and this Article does not aspire or attempt to comprehensively explore all 
relevant questions.  
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As is always the case when proposing a new or different regulatory 
regime, one opens oneself up to critique. For example, when one sug-
gests revisiting the relationship between human rights law and interna-
tional human rights law, as is the case with this Article–one question that 
does or should follow is, if we ask a different question, then are we ask-
ing the right one. This Article argues that the question of whether inter-
national human rights law is able to or even should be the sole or primary 
system of laws to govern corporate-related human rights abuses is piv-
otal—although there may also be other “right” questions that should be 
asked. 
The goals of this Article are both ambitious and modest. They are 
ambitious because the proposal of a new or different regulatory regime 
can almost always be described as ambitious. At the same time, global 
law is attracting increasing attention in non-national legal scholarship. 
Global Corporate Citizenship is not new but was developed in other 
fields and in practice, and enjoys the support of international institutions. 
Nonetheless, the proposal to develop a systematic framework for regulat-
ing transnational corporations in the area of human rights is ambitious. 
Therefore, the proposal set out in this Article is necessarily rudimentary 
and will require fleshing out over time in future articles.  
 
